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All Over the Map





We obtain rich measurements of risk preferences for 2939 subjects across
30 countries, and use the data to paint a picture of the distribution of risk
preferences across the globe using structural equation models. Reference-
dependence and likelihood-dependence are found to be important every-
where. Model parameters in non-Western countries differ systematically
from those in Western countries, with poorer countries substantially more
risk tolerant than rich countries on average. We qualify previous findings
on gender effects and cognitive ability by showing how they mainly impact
likelihood-dependence. We further add novel evidence on the correlation
between risk preferences and study major. Whereas we confirm previous
results on observable characteristics of subjects explaining little of over-
all preference heterogeneity, a few macroeconomic indicators can explain a
considerable part of the between-country heterogeneity.
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1 Motivation
Risk preferences have long been known to be too complex to be described by
a single parameter (Vickrey, 1945; Friedman and Savage, 1948). Instead, the
degree of risk tolerance of decision makers has been found to vary systematically
with prospect characteristics. Reference-dependence leads to differences in pref-
erences for gains and losses relative to a reference point. It also results in loss
aversion, the empirical finding that a given loss is attributed considerably more
weight than an equivalent gain (Markowitz, 1952). Likelihood-dependence con-
stitutes a departure from expected utility theory (EU ) whereby probabilities are
not weighted linearly, but are subjectively distorted (Preston and Baratta, 1948;
Abdellaoui, Baillon, Placido and Wakker, 2011). Both reference-dependence and
likelihood-dependence are integrated into prospect theory (PT ; Tversky and Kah-
neman, 1992), and have been shown to be crucial to account for e.g. insurance
uptake (Barseghyan, Molinari, O’Donoghue and Teitelbaum, 2013) and behavior
in financial markets (Odean, 1998; Barberis, 2013).
In a provocative article, Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan (2010) showed that
many findings in the social sciences that had been thought of as ‘established’
did not fare well once exposed to a rigorous test across different cultures. We
present comparative results on risk preferences from 30 countries including close
to 3,000 subjects obtained in controlled, incentivized experiments. We obtain
rich measurements for each subject, allowing us to estimate a flexible version
of prospect theory—a crucial element in an exploratory comparative analysis.
What is more, for two-outcome prospects as used in our experiment, nearly all
existing non-EU theories are special cases of PT (Wakker, 2010, section 7.11).
Such theories include original prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979),
rank-dependent utility (Quiggin, 1982), and disappointment aversion (Gul, 1991).
We elicit risk preferences using certainty equivalents (CEs). Participants
choose between a lottery or prospect with fixed characteristics and a changing sure
amount contained between the extreme outcomes of the prospect. This serves to
avoid the formation of endogenous references points (Hershey and Schoemaker,
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1985; Vieider, 2017), and thus allows us to fix the reference point to zero. To-
gether with their simplicity, this feature has made CEs the prime tool to elicit
PT parameters (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Bruhin, Fehr-Duda and Epper,
2010; Abdellaoui et al., 2011). By changing prospect characteristics across choice
lists, we are able to introduce the orthogonality in the characteristics of the choice
problems necessary to identify the parameters of a multi-dimensional theory such
as PT. Instead of using the single choices from each choice list, we then estimate
the parameters by directly comparing the elicited CEs to a theoretically derived
CE following Bruhin et al. (2010).
The data reveal both commonalities and differences across countries. We find
risk tolerance to decrease in the probability of winning a prize in every coun-
try for gains (with reflected, albeit somewhat less regular, patterns for losses).
This shows the universality of likelihood-insensitivity. We also find reference-
dependence and loss aversion in all countries. The main difference consists in
subjects in less developed countries exhibiting higher levels of risk tolerance on
average for both gains and losses. This casts doubt on ‘strong’ interpretations
of prospect theory, which incorporate typical parameter values in addition to
the mathematical framework of the theory (e.g., an inverse-S shaped probability
weighting function crossing the 45◦ line at about 1/3 for both gains and losses).
Building on von Gaudecker, van Soest and Wengström (2011), we show that
adopting a more flexible model does not change the conclusion that little of
the individual-level variance is explained by observable characteristics. At the
same time, we do find stable correlates of our model parameters. We qualify
the effects of well-known correlates of risk preferences such as gender and phys-
ical height (Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp and Wagner, 2011; Filip-
pin and Crosetto, 2015), by showing that they mostly correlate with likelihood-
dependence rather than with overall levels of risk tolerance. The same holds true
for the effect of cognitive ability, adding to the debate on the effect of cognitive
ability on risk tolerance (Benjamin, Brown and Shapiro, 2013; Andersson, Tyran,
Wengström and Holm, 2016). We also present new insights into the effect of study
characteristics on risk preferences (which—somewhat ironically given the heavy
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reliance on student samples in the discipline—have not been systematically doc-
umented to date). Finally, we can explain a large part of the between-country
variance using a few macroeconomic characteristics.
Our research is related to a number of other papers. Bruhin et al. (2010)
estimated a finite mixture model for Chinese and Swiss students, finding similar
proportions of subjects deviating from EU. Rieger, Wang and Hens (2015) pre-
sented survey data on risk preferences obtained from hypothetical lottery choices
with economics students across 53 countries. An even larger data set, comprising
risk preferences as well as intertemporal and social preferences, has recently been
presented by Falk, Becker, Dohmen, Enke, Huffman and Sunde (2015). While
containing data from representative samples in a large number of countries, that
data set relies on a single hypothetical measure capturing risk taking behavior.
Our data are much richer at the individual level, allowing for the estimation of
structural models. The two approaches are thus complementary.
The data of Rieger et al. (2015), on the other hand, present at least two major
problems. First, the authors elicit willingness-to-pay for gains, and willingness-
to-accept for losses. This turns all observations into mixed prospects (Kahneman,
Knetsch and Thaler, 1991a; Bateman, Kahneman, Munro, Starmer and Sugden,
2005). The difference in framing between gains and losses also distorts compar-
isons between them. Second, their stimuli are not sufficiently rich to allow for
a full estimation of PT parameters. Whereas Rieger, Wang and Hens (2017)
report an estimation of PT, they are forced to assume a one-parameter proba-
bility weighting function and to restrict this parameter to be equal for gains and
losses. Such restrictive assumptions are difficult to reconcile with the purpose of
capturing between-country differences in preferences, and we will show that both
a two-parameter weighting function and different parameters for gains and losses
are needed to properly account for our data.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical setup and
empirical strategy. Section 3 describes the subject pool and the experimental
procedures. Section 5 presents results on the main correlates of risk preferences.
Section 6 introduces heterogeneity across unobservable characteristics. Section 7
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discusses the results and concludes the paper.
2 Theoretical setup
We model preferences using prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Let
(x, p; y) be a binary prospect, where p represents the probability of winning or
losing x, and y obtains with a complementary probability 1 − p, |x| > |y|. We
describe choices between such binary prospects and sure amounts of money. Un-
der PT, utility is generated over changes in wealth rather than over total wealth
as under EU, incorporating the intuition that people adapt their reference points
to their current situations (Markowitz, 1952). Preferences are thus reference-
dependent, i.e. they may differ for gains and losses relative to a reference point.
The experiment was framed in such a way that the reference point corresponds to
zero (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Bruhin et al., 2010; Abdellaoui et al., 2011).
For outcomes that fall purely into one domain, i.e. x > y ≥ 0 or 0 ≥ y > x, we
can represent the utility of a prospect, PU , as follows:
PU = ws(p)v(x) + (1− ws(p)) v(y), (1)
where the probability weighting function, w(p), is a continuous and strictly in-
creasing function that satisfies w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1; the superscript s indicates
sign-dependence and can take the values + for gains and− for losses; and v(.) rep-
resents a utility function which indicates preferences over outcomes. Under PT,
utility curvature cannot be automatically equated with risk preferences, since the
latter are determined jointly by the utility and the weighting functions (Schmidt
and Zank, 2008). For mixed prospects, where x > 0 > y, the utility of the
prospect can be represented as:
PU = w+(p)v(x) + w−(1− p)v(y). (2)
In order to specify the model set out above, we need to determine the func-
tional forms to be used. Whereas PT is very flexible, it has the disadvantage that
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the utility and weighting functions can exhibit a substantial degree of collinearity
when using parametric estimations in the presence of noise (Zeisberger, Vrecko
and Langer, 2012). This issue becomes particularly bothersome when estimations
are based on relatively few observations, which is the case when we estimate pa-
rameter distributions over all subjects in our random parameter model. In our
favorite specification, we thus assume utility to be piecewise linear:
v(x) =

x if x > 0
−λ(−x) if x ≤ 0
(3)
where λ > 1 indicates loss aversion, captured by a kink in the utility function at
the origin (Köbberling and Wakker, 2005; Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt and Paraschiv,
2007). Loss aversion is a central component of risk aversion, and has been indi-
cated as the main driver of small stakes risk aversion (Rabin, 2000; Rabin and
Thaler, 2001), the willingness-to-pay willingness-to-accept disparity (Bateman et
al., 2005), the endowment effect (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1991b), and
the equity premium puzzle (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995). Risk preferences are thus
completely captured by probability weighting and loss aversion. While this may
appear unusual to economists, it captures a fundamental psychological intuition
about risk preferences. In the words of Yaari (1987), “at the level of fundamental
principles, risk aversion and diminishing marginal utility of wealth ... are horses
of different colors. The former expresses an attitude towards risk (increasing
uncertainty hurts), whereas the latter expresses an attitude towards wealth (the
loss of a sheep hurts more when an agent is poor than when an agent is rich)” (p.
95). While utility curvature is clearly important when stakes are large, allowing
for non-linear utility generally only takes up some of the risk preferences other-
wise captured in probability weighting over the relatively modest stake ranges
we use (see Bouchouicha and Vieider, 2017a, for specific evidence on stake varia-
tion under PT). This simplification further provides a good compromise between
descriptive fit and tractability. In particular, it fits the aggregate data better
than alternative simplifications, such as EU (z = 60.45, p < 0.001; Vuong ,1989,
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test; all results are stable to using a Clark test instead), or reference-depend
models assuming linear probabilities and non-linear utility (z = 44.68, p < 0.001;
Markowitz, 1952; von Gaudecker et al., 2011). A robustness check abandoning
this assumption is included in the Online Appendix.
For probability weighting, we adopt the 2-parameter weighting function pro-
posed by Prelec (1998). Using an alternative two-parameter function by Gold-
stein and Einhorn (1987) does not qualitatively affect our results. We used the
function developed by Prelec as it provides a significantly better fit to our aggre-
gate data (z = 3.606, p < 0.001, Vuong test):
ws(p) = exp(−βs(−ln(p))αs), (4)
where s again indicates gains and losses. The parameter α governs the curvature
of the probability weighting function, with α = 1 indicating that probabilities
are treated linearly (the EU case), and α < 1 representing the typical case of
likelihood-insensitivity. This results in the characteristic inverse S-shaped weight-
ing function (Wu and Gonzalez, 1996; Abdellaoui, 2000; Bleichrodt and Pinto,
2000; Kilka and Weber, 2001). Likelihood-insensitivity captures the phenomenon
whereby a given change in probability is attributed a greater weight when it is
added to a probability of 0 or subtracted from a probability of 1 than in the
intermediate probability range. It can account for many important empirical ob-
servations, the prime example amongst which is the coexistence of insurance and
lottery play (Friedman and Savage, 1948; Markowitz, 1952; Kahneman and Tver-
sky, 1979). The effect of changes in α for a fixed value of β = 1 are illustrated
in figure 1(a). Holding β constant, a decrease in α will indicate more extreme
risk preferences at the probability endpoints (providing it was 1 or smaller to
start with), and less sensitivity to changes in probabilities in the middle of the
probability spectrum. We will henceforth refer to α simply as sensitivity.
The parameter β determines where an inverse S-shaped function will cross
the 45 degree line. This is illustrated in figure 1(b) for the case of α = 0.65.
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Figure 1: Illustration of weighting parameters
and downwards for values of β larger than 1, and to the right and upwards for
values smaller than 1. Holding α constant, larger values of β will thus indicate
a decrease in risk tolerance for gains, and an increase in risk tolerance for losses
under our linear utility assumption. We will henceforth refer to the β parameter
as pessimism for gains, and as optimism for losses.
3 Experimental setup and methods
The experiment was conducted in 30 countries distributed across all inhabited
continents. The countries were chosen according to the economic importance,
geographical location, and to obtain diversity across dimensions such as GDP
per capita and the Hofstede (1980) cultural attitudes scales. We used in par-
ticular the Hofstede scales in guiding our selection of countries in regions that
might otherwise seem relatively homogenous, such as Europe. Indeed, whereas
European or Latin American countries may share a general cultural heritage and
similar levels of economic development, they differ markedly on some of the Hof-
stede scales, such as in respect to their uncertainty avoidance. Students were
used in order to obtain high quality data, and because the use of homogenous
population pools is generally considered desirable in international comparisons
(Hofstede, 1980). Potential issues arising from selection effects will be discussed
below.
The data this paper is based on were first introduced by Vieider, Lefebvre,
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Bouchouicha, Chmura, Hakimov, Krawczyk and Martinsson (2015a). That paper
did, however, not provide a detailed analysis of the risk preference data across
prospects, using only non-parametric measures of risk preferences aggregated
across probabilities and stake levels, and focusing on correlations with survey
questions devised to capture risk taking behavior, as well as with aggregate mea-
sures for uncertainty (unknown probabilities). This is thus the main paper on
risk preferences in the comparative dataset. A companion paper on ambiguity at-
titudes uses stimuli included in the experiment for which no precise probabilities
were provided, and the analysis of which is not included in this paper (L’Haridon,
Vieider, Aycinena, Bandur, Belianin, Cingl, Kothiyal and Martinsson, 2017).
A total of 2939 subjects took part in the experiment. Subjects were generally
recruited at major public universities located in the capital or in other major
cities of a country. Exceptions to this rule were Brazil, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia,
and Tunisia, where we conducted the experiment at a private university (see
Appendix for the exact location of the experiments). We made every effort to
keep conditions as similar as possible across countries. We recruited subjects
using flyers, which announced economic experiments in which subjects could
earn money according to their choices. Amounts to be won were not mentioned.
In countries where we could recruit through standing subject pools, we only
recruited subjects who were relatively new to experiments (< 3) in order to keep
conditions as equal as possible across countries. We tried to recruit subjects with
an eye to equal gender proportions and to a wide representation of study majors.
This did not always work to the desired point—in Saudi Arabia, for instance, our
male contact was not allowed to interact with female students, so that we have an
all male sample. An overview of the main subject characteristics can be found in
appendix A. The complete instructions are included in the Online Appendix (for
languages other than English, see www.ferdinandvieider.com/instructions.html).
A total of 28 prospects are included in this study. In addition, 16 more
prospect were included in the experiment to measure ambiguity, and are not dis-
cussed here. Prospects were kept in a fixed order so as to make the task easier
to understand. Since the experiment was conducted using paper and pencil, this
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made the organization more straightforward, and avoided potential issues deriv-
ing from different order proportions in different countries. A large-scale pilot
with 330 subjects in Vietnam showed that preferences elicited in such a fixed
order were no different from those elicited in a randomized order, while resulting
in lower noise levels (results available upon request). Gains were always pre-
sented first. There were 14 prospects for risky gains and 13 prospects for risky
losses, plus one mixed prospect to determine loss aversion (one prospect being
enough to identify loss aversion, given that all other parameters are identified
from pure gains or pure losses). For both gains and losses, we presented prospects
with 50-50 probabilities first, namely {5, 0; 10, 0; 20, 0; 30, 0; 30, 10; 30, 20} and
{−5, 0;−10, 0;−20, 0;−20,−5;−20,−10}. These prospects were followed by prospects
in order of ascending probability, with p = i/8, i = 1, ..., 8, offering either the PPP-
equivalent of e20 or 0 (−20 or 0 for losses), as well as 20 or 5 (-20 or -5) with the
two extreme probabilities. Losses were always implemented from an endowment
equal to the maximum possible loss, given conditional on the loss part being
selected for payoff determination.
In order to guarantee comparability across countries, we converted the payoffs
using purchasing power parity (PPP). All experiments were run between Septem-
ber 2011 and October 2012. The duration of the experiment was about one hour,
and the expected payoff for an expected value maximizer was about e18, includ-
ing a show-up fee of e4. We used PPP data from the World Bank for 2010 as
our main conversion tool. In addition, we checked the conversion rates using net
hourly wages of student assistants at the university where the experiments were
carried out. Adjustments based on the wage rates mainly aided us in rounding
decisions. One may be worried that differences between countries may nonethe-
less be influenced by imprecisions in PPP conversions. Pilots showed that stake
variations in the range of ±20% did not impact estimated risk preferences (Viei-
der, 2012). Another issue in international comparisons is that the ‘treatment’
of interest is given by the socio-cultural and socio-economic background of sub-
jects, for which randomization is clearly impossible. To ensure that differences
were not simply driven by selection effects, in another pilot Vieider, Chmura,
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Fisher, Kusakawa, Martinsson, Mattison Thompson and Sunday (2015b) exam-
ined the differences in preferences obtained at various locations within a country.
Almost no within-country differences in risk preferences were found once observ-
able characteristics of decision makers were controlled for. Potential selection
effects deriving from using only students will be further discussed below, based
on results obtained with general population samples.
For each prospect, subjects faced a choice between sure amounts varying in
equal steps between the minimum and maximum amount in the prospect, and the
prospect itself (with exception of the mixed prospect). The sure amount always
covered the whole range of the prospect, to avoid issues deriving from cutting
off choice lists arbitrarily (Andersson et al., 2016). The certainty equivalent of
the prospect was the midpoint between the two points where preference switched.
This was meant to exclude the possibility of obtaining rates of multiple switching
that differed between countries, and to have to exclude such subjects, since im-
puting a preference satisfying monotonicity to multiple switchers would require
additional assumptions. At the end of the game, one of the choices for which a
decision had to be made between a prospect and a sure amount was randomly
selected for real pay—the standard procedure in the literature (Cubitt, Starmer
and Sugden, 1998; Abdellaoui et al., 2011).
4 Econometric model
Identification
The choice lists included in our experiment were designed explicitly in such a way
as to allow us to separately identify the PT parameters introduced above, which
jointly describe the risk preferences of decision makers. While nonparametric
methods to measure the different PT components exist (Wakker and Deneffe,
1996; Abdellaoui, 2000), such methods are typically more difficult to administer,
and may suffer from error propagation because of their chained nature. Certainty
equivalents, on the other hand, require structural estimations to elicit the full set
of PT parameters. Under our linear utility assumption, which allows in principle
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for a non-parametric description of results, the fitting of functional forms permits
us to reduce the number of parameters significantly, and thus to more efficiently
summarize the results.
Let us begin from our favorite specification assuming piecewise linear utility.
Probability weighting can be identified simply from variation in probabilities,
while keeping outcomes constant. For gains or losses, we can write the indifference
between the CE and the prospect simply as ce = w(p)x + (1 − w(p))y. By





This equation allows us to nonparametrically trace a probability weighting
function from the prospects offering (the PPP equivalent of) e20 or else zero
with different probabilities of winning the prize. The distance of the probability
weights from the 45◦ line for the different probabilities p, given by w(p)− p, now
serves to identify the pessimism/optimism parameter β. In particular, larger CEs
in absolute terms result in more elevated functions, which ceteris paribus indicate
increased optimism for gains (since the weight is attached to the best outcome)
and increased pessimism for losses (since the weight is attached to to the worst
outcome). At the same time, the sensitivity parameters α are determined by
the way the distance w(p)− p changes when probabilities change. In particular,
the typical inverse-S shape of the probability weighting function results from
a positive difference when probabilities are small, which turns into a negative
difference as probabilities increase.
Once the probability weights have been identified, it is straightforward to
identify loss aversion. The latter results from an indifference between a sure
zero outcome and a prospect (x, 0.5; y), which gives the identity 0 = w+(0.5)x−





Since the probability weights are identified following equation 5, this directly iden-
12
tifies the loss aversion parameter λ. In particular, holding the ratio w+(0.5)/w−(0.5)
of probability weights constant, the smaller the absolute loss amount |y| start-
ing from which a respondent prefers playing the lottery over the status quo, the
higher her level of loss aversion.
Finally, we briefly discuss the identification of the whole PT model, including
nonlinear utility over gains and losses. Given that we now have an additional
parameter describing risk preferences in the pure gain and pure loss domains, we
can no longer recover the functions nonparametrically using CEs. The identifica-
tion of the utility function then derives from varying the outcomes of a prospect
while keeping the probabilities constant. For a given probability weighting func-
tion, any change in risk preferences must now be reflected in utility curvature.
To be able to cleanly separate utility and probability weighting, it is furthermore
essential to include nonzero lower outcomes in the prospect, which serves to avoid
collinearity in the parameters which would make their separation impossible. Un-
der deterministic choice, this serves to clearly separate utility from probability
weighting. Issues may, however, occur in the presence of measurement noise—see
Zeisberger et al. (2012) for simulation results and a detailed discussion.
Stochastic modelling and econometrics
For a given prospect involving pure gains or losses, we can represent the modeled
certainty equivalent, ĉei, under the assumption of deterministic choice as follows:
ĉei = w
s(pi)xi + (1− ws(pi))yi (7)
For mixed prospects with xi > 0 > yi, we can define the modeled equivalent loss







Both the modeled certainty equivalents ĉei in Equation 7 and the modeled loss
equivalents ŷi in Equation 8 depend on the preference parameters {αs, βs, λ}.
The difference in the identifying equation is driven by the difference in elicitation
methods for mixed prospects and for gains and losses.
We now introduce an explicit stochastic structure. We start from the obser-
vation that responses recorded in the experiment will be affected by noise, be it
generated by errors in utility calculation, errors in recording the answers, or from
the mis-specification of the model relative to the true underlying decision process
generating the data (Train, 2009). The observed certainty equivalent cei will
thus be equal to the certainty equivalent calculated from our model plus some
independently distributed error term, or cei = ĉei + εi. We assume this error to
be normally distributed, εi ∼ N (0, σ2i ). The parameter σi indicates the standard
deviation of a so-called Fechner error (Hey and Orme, 1994; Loomes and Sugden,
1995; Loomes, 2005).
We allow for three different types of heteroscedasticity following Bruhin, Fehr-
Duda and Epper (2010). Firstly, the error is allowed to differ between gains and
losses. We define the error parameter for losses as the sum of the error parameter
for gains plus a domain-specific error component ω. For mixed prospects, we
adopt the error for losses, since it is the loss amount that varies in the mixed
choice lists. Secondly, we allow the error term to depend on the specific prospect,
or rather, on the difference between the high and low outcome in the prospect,
such that σsi = σs|xi − yi|. For the mixed prospects, the error term depends on
the maximum range in the loss domain. This takes into account that the error
may be related to the length of the choice list, which will vary with the difference
between the two outcomes of the prospect given fixed steps between the sure
amounts. Finally, we let the error term σ depend linearly on the characteristics
of the decision maker, n, so that σs = σ0 + Xnη, with η a vector of regression
parameters. This specification performs significantly better than a homoscedastic
specification according to a likelihood ratio test (χ2(1) = 14603.76, p < 0.001).
We can express the probability density function ψ(.) for a given subject n
and prospect ξi as follows
14










where φ is the standard normal density function, and θn = {αsn, βsn, λn, σn, ω}
indicates the vector of model parameters. The s = + index is omitted from the
parameter σn for notational convenience. For mixed prospects, ĉei and cei have
to be replaced by ŷi and yi respectively in Equation (9).
The individual likelihood function is equal to the product of the density func-











Within this grand likelihood, we let the vector of parameters depend linearly on
the observable characteristics of decision makers, such that θn = θk+Xnγ, where
θk is a vector of constants and Xn represents a matrix of observable character-
istics of the decision maker. For simplicity, the parameter ω is assumed to be
independent of the characteristics of the decision maker.
We use a random parameter model to take into account unobserved hetero-
geneity in addition to the observed heterogeneity captured by γ in the model
above. This amounts to estimating the distribution of the parameters θn from
the aggregate data. We make two assumptions here. First, we transform the
parameters using an exponential function, thus imposing that all parameters be
positive.1 Second, we assume the parameter distributions based on unobserv-
able characteristics to be normally distributed, independent of the observable
characteristics, and independent of each other. This amounts to assuming that
1For example, the error term sigman for a decision maker n is defined as exp(ξi,σ +Xnη),
for an individual effect ξi,σ capturing unobserved heterogeneity.
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ζ, the vector of random parameters, follows a multivariate normal distribution
with mean zero and diagonal covariance matrix Ω = ΣΣ′.2 Conditional on a
given realization of ζ, the contribution to the likelihood for subject n is given by







where f(.) denotes the multivariate normal distribution, and the dimension of
the integral corresponds to the number of parameters to be estimated. Taking
logs and summing over individuals gives the aggregate log-likelihood function to
be maximized.
We estimate the log-likelihood function (11) in Stata using standard estima-
tion techniques, and use it to determine the effects of observable characteristics
in sections 5.1 to 5.4. The errors are always clustered at the subject level. Be-
cause the multiple integral in Equation (12) does not have a closed-form solution,
we estimate the log-likelihood function by maximum-simulated likelihood. The
estimation is performed in Matlab using Halton sequences of length 500 per indi-
vidual.3 We use it to represent heterogeneity across unobservable characteristics
in section 6. All estimations employ the BFGS algorithm.
5 Results
We present the results in four stages. We start by presenting aggregate estimates
for our global data. We then move on to the between-country comparison. This
involves showing differences between countries, as well as trying to determine
possible factors explaining such differences. The third stage looks at individual-
2This specification does not allow for correlation accross individual-specific parameters,
which is a limitation of our approach. This limitation is justified by computational reasons.
Relaxing this hypothesis would require imposing additional assumptions (e.g identity of param-
eters between gains and losses, imposing a one-parameter form for the probability weighting
function, or restricting the impact of observable heterogeneity) in order keep the number of
estimated parameters reasonable.
3Morokoff and Caflisch (1995) shows that Halton sequences give the best performance in
terms of integration error for multiple integrals with dimensions up to 6 (see also Train, 2009,
on Halton sequences).
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level correlates controlling for country fixed effects. Stage four then takes a look
at overall heterogeneity and the extent to which the latter can be explained
through individual and country characteristics.
5.1 Global estimates
We start by presenting the global estimates of our preference functions. This es-
tablishes a benchmark of ‘globally representative preference parameters’, albeit
for students only. The probability weighting functions for gains and losses are
shown in figure 2. For both gains and losses, we find considerable likelihood-
insensitivity, with α+ = 0.602 (se = 0.005) and α− = 0.641 (se = 0.006). In
terms of pessimism for gains and optimism for losses, we find β+ = 0.908 (se =
0.003) and β− = 0.941 (se = 0.004). Although the parameters are significantly
different between gains and losses from a statistical point of view, the two func-
tions can be seen to be economically very similar. This is an indication of re-
flection at this highest level of aggregation, resulting in risk seeking for small
probability gains and large probability losses, and in risk aversion for small prob-
ability losses and large probability gains. We furthermore find clear evidence for
loss aversion, with λ = 1.939 (se = 0.017) being close to, but slightly below, the




















Figure 2: Probability weighting functions for gains and losses based on the global data
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5.2 Between-country differences
We next show differences between countries. The effects shown are based on a
regression with country dummies and a female dummy, added because the pro-
portion of females differs across countries (gender effects in our data will be dis-
cussed below). Figure 3(a) shows some typical probability weighting functions for
gains. The USA display the pattern hitherto thought of as typical—small proba-
bilities are overweighed, moderate to large probabilities underweighted, and the
function crosses the 45◦ line at around 0.3 (Wu and Gonzalez, 1996; Abdellaoui,
2000; Bleichrodt, Pinto and Wakker, 2001). While China only displays slightly
less pessimism than the US (consistent with the results of Bruhin et al., 2010),
other countries such as Vietnam, Ethiopia or Nicaragua have much lower degrees
of pessimism.4 The pattern here is one of increased risk tolerance, which reaches
up to well beyond the midpoint of the probability scale.5
Figure 3(b) shows a scatter plot of the sensitivity and pessimism parameters.
All countries show likelihood-insensitivity, with a sensitivity parameter below 0.9.
Most sensitivity parameters are also at or above 0.5, with the exception of Nigeria.
In terms of the pessimism parameter, Germany, Australia, and the US are the
countries with the highest parameter values. They are then followed mostly
by other industrialized countries such as Spain, Belgium, and Japan (although
India is also far to the right). The next group to the left, roughly between a
value of 0.8 and 0.9, is constituted mostly by middle income countries such as
Brazil, Malaysia, Tunisia, and Vietnam (and with the UK as an exception to the
middle income rule). The least pessimistic group to the far left is constituted
by low-income countries such as Ethiopia, Peru, Nicaragua, and Nigeria. We
find a marginally significant correlation between the sensitivity and pessimism
parameters (ρ = 0.356, p = 0.054, Spearman rank correlation), going in the
4If we allow for utility curvature in addition to probability weighting, this pattern is still
captured mostly in the weighting function, and not in the utility function—see Online Appendix
for a detailed stability analysis.
5The Online Appendix provides additional analyses in this respect, including graphs showing
pairwise comparison of countries with confidence bands, to show that we indeed find significant
differences in terms of risk tolerance, and not only in terms of the parameters of the weighting
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Figure 3: Probability weighting functions for gains
direction of more pessimistic countries exhibiting higher sensitivity.
Figure 4(a) shows typical weighting functions for losses. The patterns are less
regular than for gains. In the US and China we again find a pattern of overweight-
ing of small probabilities (now indicating risk aversion) and underweighting of
large probabilities (indicating risk seeking), although the function appears to be
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somewhat flatter than for gains. Guatemala shows a pattern of mild risk seeking
throughout. Ethiopia and Cambodia, on the other hand, have low sensitivity,
which leads to substantial risk aversion for small probabilities and strong risk
seeking for moderate to large probabilities. The findings are consistent with the
consensus in the literature that there is less regularity for losses than for gains
(Abdellaoui, 2000). Especially the data for Ethiopia and Cambodia appear to
depart somewhat from previously observed functions.
Figure 4(b) shows the parameters of the weighting function for losses in a
scatter plot. Once again, most countries have sensitivity parameters between
0.9 and about 0.5. The exceptions to this rule are Guatemala, which has an
almost linear function, and Cambodia and Nigeria, which exhibit extremely low
sensitivity. The results for Australia show low levels of optimism, now indicated
by its position to the very left in the graph. As observed for gains, there appears
to be again a general tendency for poor and medium income countries to display
more optimism than WEIRD countries. This tendency is, however, much less
clear than for gains. We find no correlation between the optimism and sensitivity
parameters (ρ = −0.178, p = 0.347).
5.3 Economic Indicators
Having established the main differences between countries, it is now at the time
to see whether we can find some systematic relations. Prime candidates for the
explanation of the differences discussed above are measures of income. Table 1
regresses the parameters of the structural model on GDP (measured as the differ-
ence of per capita GDP from the US, the richest country in our sample, in logs)
and the Gini coefficient (normalized so that it is 0 for the US) as an indicator
of income inequality. The regression also controls for whether a participant is a
self-declared national of the country or not (foreigner). We further control for
gender, which will be discussed below (the results are also stable to inserting ad-
ditional demographic controls). Finally, we use a dummy to indicate whether the
experiment was executed at a private university (equal to 1 for Brazil, Malaysia,
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Figure 4: Probability weighting functions for losses
bers of the petroleum-producing cartel OPEC. Private-university students may
be expected to come from relatively wealthier families, so that we would expect
them to be relatively more risk tolerant due to the positive correlation between
income and risk tolerance generally found within countries (see Hopland, Matsen
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and Strøm, 2013 for a review of this correlation).6 The OPEC dummy marks oil
producing countries, in which GDP deriving from oil production does generally
not accrue to the general population (this is standard in macroeconomic accounts
of income levels, see e.g. Ashraf and Galor, 2011; Olsson and Hibbs, 2005).
We start by discussing the effects of GDP per capita. Sensitivity decreases
with poverty for both gains and losses, whereas noise increases. Poorer countries
exhibit less pessimism for gains, as well as more optimism for losses. Poor coun-
tries also tend to exhibit higher levels of loss aversion than rich countries. Being
a foreigner in a country shows no effect on risk preferences. Income distribution
as measured by the Gini coefficient, on the other hand, shows a strong and highly
significant effect on sensitivity for losses, with more unequal countries exhibiting
higher sensitivity. Subjects from private universities show lower pessimism for
gains, and lower optimism for losses (marginally significant). OPEC countries
have lower sensitivity for both gains and losses. They are also less pessimistic for
gains, while at the same time exhibiting higher noise levels. In other words, they
display the decision patterns typical of poorer countries as hypothesized, with
effects aligned with those of relative poverty.
Table 1: Effects of income measures on risk preferences
N=2939, LL = −217, 069 α+ β+ α− β− λ σ
GDP difference -0.058*** -0.063*** -0.095*** 0.032*** 0.194*** 0.032***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.024) (0.002)
foreigner 0.026 -0.000 -0.006 0.027 -0.003 0.018**
(0.034) (0.031) (0.040) (0.029) (0.081) (0.007)
Gini coefficient 0.012 0.009 0.039*** 0.008 -0.010 0.001
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.022) (0.002)
private university 0.013 -0.064*** -0.047 -0.042* 0.091 -0.000
(0.027) (0.022) (0.032) (0.025) (0.080) (0.005)
OPEC -0.264*** -0.145*** -0.270*** -0.055 0.432*** 0.065***
(0.031) (0.025) (0.031) (0.034) (0.149) (0.006)
female dummy X X X X X X
constant 0.777*** 1.010*** 0.877*** 0.914*** 1.611*** 0.157***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.012) (0.042) (0.004)
* (p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01)
GDP difference indicates the difference of GDP per capita from the US in logs; i.e. relative poverty
GDP data are from the World Bank tables for 2011, measured in purchasing power parity
The Gini coefficient is the most recent before 2011 available; source: World Bank and CIA factbook
6This being a student subject pool, we have no measures of income at the individual level.
We tried instead to obtain measures of stipends and expenses, however, the latter are extremely
noisy and thus not very informative, so that we prefer not to report them here.
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We may wonder whether the results presented here are stable. In particular,
the correlation with GDP may be suspected of proxying for other variables. We
tested this by adding a number of variables to the above regression: i) geograph-
ical variables, such as absolute latitude and whether a country is landlocked, as
well as continental dummies (Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger, 1999); ii) a variety of
variables indicating institutional quality (Keefer and Knack, 1997); iii) dummies
indicating legal origins (Porta, Lopez-de Silanes and Shleifer, 2008); and iv) data
on the genetic diversity within each country (Ashraf and Galor, 2013). GDP per
capita remains highly significant in all of the regressions. The other variables at
best show weak effects on risk preferences—the full regressions can be found in
the Online Appendix. Analyzing the risk preference data reported in Falk et al.
(2015) at the macroeconomic level, Becker, Dohmen, Enke and Falk (2015) report
a strong correlation with genetic diversity (and only a much weaker correlation
with GDP). This is exactly the inverse of our findings. This discrepancy may
well be due to the fact that a question about one’s ‘willingness to take risk’ cap-
tures more than just risk preferences (Vieider et al., 2015a). We do indeed find
a correlation of genetic difference measures with ambiguity attitudes (L’Haridon
et al., 2017), which may thus reconcile these differences in findings.
The data just presented could be driven by systematic selection effects. If stu-
dents in poorer countries come systematically from relatively richer families, that
may explain the strong correlation with GDP per capita. This appears not to be
an issue in practice. Several papers have tested the difference between students
and general population samples, generally finding no or only minor differences
in aggregate risk preferences between these samples (see e.g. Andersen, Harri-
son, Lau and Rutström, 2010 for Denmark, and Fehr-Duda and Epper, 2012, for
Switzerland). We have furthermore carried out a precise test of selection effects
in our sample. Vieider, Beyene, Bluffstone, Dissanayake, Gebreegziabher, Mar-
tinsson and Mekonnen (2016) report data from an experiment conducted using
the same type of tasks as employed in this paper with a representative sample of
the rural population of Ethiopia—the poorest country in our sample and one of
the most risk tolerant. The results clearly showed that the rural samples showed
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similar risk attitudes to the Ethiopian student sample. At the same time, the
rural Ethiopian population sample was found to be more risk tolerant than our
Western samples (see also Vieider, Truong, Martinsson and Pham Khanh, 2013
and Di Falco and Vieider, 2017, for further evidence). This clearly rejects an
explanation based on systematic selection.
5.4 Individual Characteristics
Table 2 shows the effects of physical characteristics, in particular, gender, age,
and height, while controlling for country effects using dummies. A large number
of studies both in the economic laboratory and in the field have found gender dif-
ferences in risk taking behavior (Eckel and Grossman, 2008). There remain some
doubts whether gender effects are universal or whether they may vary between
countries (Croson and Gneezy, 2009), and on the extent to which they may be
task-specific (Filippin and Crosetto, 2015). We add to this discussion by show-
ing evidence from a number of different countries, and by examining regularities
over the probability and outcome spaces. We find women to display significantly
lower sensitivity than men for both gains and losses. At the same time, women
exhibit significantly higher noise levels. For gains, we also find women to be more
pessimistic than men, although this effect is relatively small.
Table 2: Effects of physical characteristics on risk preferences
N=2939, LL = −214, 201 α+ β+ α− β− λ σ
female -0.092*** 0.036** -0.072*** -0.021 -0.040 0.011***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.020) (0.016) (0.052) (0.004)
age -0.008 0.002 0.009 0.016** 0.018 0.009***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.022) (0.002)
height 0.026** -0.005 0.017 0.019** -0.009 -0.005**
(0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.029) (0.002)
country fixed effects X X X X X X
constant (USA) 0.767*** 1.052*** 0.863*** 0.934*** 1.616*** 0.161***
(0.032) (0.028) (0.038) (0.027) (0.088) (0.007)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; age and height are z-scores
z-scores are used for age and height
Given the relatively narrow age range in our sample, we are reluctant to
over-interpret the effect found. We replicate recent findings of physical height
correlating with risk preferences (Dohmen et al., 2011). This effect goes in the
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direction of taller people exhibiting higher sensitivity, although this effect is sig-
nificant only for gains. For losses, taller people are found to be more optimistic.
Finally, taller people also have lower noise levels in their decision processes. It is
not entirely clear why such effects are found for taller people. One hypothesis is
that physical height, or rather its lack, may reflect diseases and socio-economic
conditions in childhood (Peck and Lundberg, 1995; Maccini and Yang, 2009;
Dercon and Porter, 2014).
Table 3 shows the effects of study major and grade point average (GPA; nor-
malized to the same scale across countries and transformed into z-scores). GPA
shows the effects we would expect to see using it as an—albeit imperfect—proxy
for cognitive ability. A higher GPA is correlated with increased sensitivity for
both gains and losses, as well as reduced noise levels. This is consistent with inter-
pretations of likelihood-insensitivity as a rationality failure (Tversky and Wakker,
1995; Wakker, 2010). A higher GPA also correlates with lower levels of loss aver-
sion. This is consistent with studies that have found that loss aversion is reduced
amongst professional traders (List, 2004), and with studies that have found de-
biasing mechanisms such as asking subjects to give reasons for their choices to
result in lower loss aversion (Pahlke, Strasser and Vieider, 2012). We also find a
marginally significant positive correlation of GPA with pessimism for gains. This
correlation runs counter to accounts of risk aversion resulting from low cognitive
ability (Benjamin et al., 2013), but is consistent with recent criticisms of that
literature (Andersson et al., 2016).
We also find significant effects of study major as measured against economics
students. We find hardly any differences in risk preferences for students of math-
ematics and engineering, the natural sciences, or medicine. The differences ob-
tained for students of the social sciences, the humanities, arts, and other study
majors (made up mostly by law students) appear, on the other hand, to be
systematic. There is a general tendency amongst these majors to display lower
sensitivity. At the same time, they are more prone to errors or noise. We hy-
pothesize that these effects are due to a lower exposure to formal mathematics,
or a selection into these disciplines based on lower mathematical ability.
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Table 3: Effects of study major on risk preferences
N=2939, LL = −213, 8628 α+ β+ α− β− λ σ
GPA 0.028*** 0.013* 0.042*** -0.006 -0.054** -0.007***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.024) (0.002)
math & engineering 0.005 -0.008 0.031 0.027 -0.069 -0.004
(0.022) (0.020) (0.025) (0.020) (0.068) (0.005)
natural sciences -0.041 0.007 -0.070** -0.029 -0.101 0.007
(0.030) (0.026) (0.034) (0.025) (0.086) (0.006)
medicine 0.026 0.000 -0.016 -0.053 -0.113 -0.001
(0.041) (0.037) (0.049) (0.037) (0.087) (0.008)
social sciences -0.095*** 0.026 -0.097*** -0.019 -0.027 0.018***
(0.028) (0.024) (0.030) (0.024) (0.071) (0.005)
humanities -0.077** 0.001 -0.022 0.011 0.018 0.018***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.037) (0.027) (0.091) (0.007)
arts -0.041 -0.052 -0.123** 0.011 0.176 0.022**
(0.051) (0.040) (0.050) (0.050) (0.156) (0.009)
study other -0.068*** 0.016 -0.048* -0.016 -0.045 0.017***
(0.024) (0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.065) (0.005)
physical characteristics X X X X X X
country dummies X X X X X X
constant 0.777*** 1.038*** 0.858*** 0.947*** 1.705*** 0.159***
(0.035) (0.032) (0.041) (0.031) (0.101) (0.008)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
social sciences exclude economics students, who serve as reference
Finally, we can address the effect of cultural variables on risk preferences.
Some of the previous literature has emphasized accounts based on survey mea-
sures of cultural attitudes (Hofstede, 1980). For instance, Weber and Hsee
(1998) compared four countries using hypothetical certainty equivalents for 50-
50 prospects. They organized the results using the individualism-collectivism
dimension, and concluding that relatively collectivistic societies such as China
or Poland exhibit lower risk aversion compared to Germany and the US because
of the implicit insurance provided by the closer social fabric. Notice, however,
how their findings are also consistent with GDP differences. Rieger et al. (2015)
explained risk preferences obtained in a survey with economics students in a large
number of countries mostly based on uncertainty avoidance, another of the Hof-
stede cultural scales. In a companion paper, Wang, Rieger and Hens (2016) ex-
plain cross country differences in loss aversion again through the Hofstede scales,
although in this case it is mostly through masculinity and individualism. Some-
what surprisingly, we find virtually no explicative power of Hofstede’s cultural
scales—details are provided in the Online Appendix.
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Another cultural dimension that has received some attention in the literature
on risk preferences is religious affiliation. Results obtained so far are not con-
sistent. Some researchers have concluded that Protestants are less risk averse
than Catholics (Dohmen et al., 2011), while others have reached the opposite
conclusion (Noussair, Trautmann, van de Kuilen and Vellekoop, 2013). There
is little evidence on religions other than the Judeo-Christian ones prevalent in
the West. We find no difference between Catholics and Protestants in our data.
While we find some differences for other religious affiliations, such as e.g. Jews
being less risk averse than Protestants for gains (see also Barsky, Kimball, Juster
and Shapiro, 1997), these correlations are not systematic and likely spurious. The
regressions and a discussion of the results are presented in the Online Appendix.
6 Explained and unexplained heterogeneity
In this last section of the results, we take a closer look at overall preference
heterogeneity based on our random parameter estimates described in equation
12. We thereby focus on developing intuition based on graphs of parameter
distributions, and on discussing the most important insights deriving from this
analysis. More detailed statistical results can be found in the Online Appendix.
We start by discussing overall heterogeneity in risk preferences, and in par-
ticular likelihood-dependence and reference-dependence. We find considerable
heterogeneity for all preference parameters. Likelihood-insensitivity appears to
be the norm. For gains, the distribution implies that 82% of our subjects have
a sensitivity parameter below 1, with only 12% of subjects characterized by a
sensitivity value close to 1 (i.e with α+ lying in the range [0.9; 1.1]). For losses,
76% of the population have a sensitivity parameter below 1 and 14% of subjects
have a sensitivity value close to 1. We also find considerable heterogeneity in loss
aversion. The parameter estimates correspond to a distribution with a median
value of 2, very close the value estimated above.7 This distribution implies that
7The Online Appendix reports correlations between the point estimates at the country level
using the approach from the first part of the median values obtained from the random param-
eter estimates at the same level, and shows that they are highly correlated. This proves the
consistency of the two approaches.
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94% of the loss aversion parameters fall in the range [1; 5], and corresponds to
the usual benchmarks used in the literature (Barberis, 2013).
We now proceed to comparing the overall heterogeneity in preference param-
eters estimated across all individuals to formulations of our random parameter
model that allow us to visualize heterogeneity across observable characteristics.
We proceed as follows. We start by estimating a model with only country dum-
mies to capture differences between countries. By definition, such a model cap-
tures all of the between-country variance. We then use this model as a benchmark
case to discuss individual and macro-economic characteristics. In particular, we
are interested in how much more of the overall heterogeneity in preference pa-
rameters we can explain by adding a large set of observable individual character-
istics. When it comes to the macro-economic characteristics, our interest lies in
how much of the heterogeneity captured by country dummies can be explained
when using a smaller number of country characteristics such as GDP instead.
Figure 5 compares the heterogeneity captured by the country dummies to the
heterogeneity captured by country dummies plus individual characteristics. The
outermost curves represent the overall heterogeneity in the two estimations.8
Adding country dummies by definition explains all of the heterogeneity across
countries. The proportion of overall heterogeneity explained by the country dum-
mies remains, however, quite modest. This shows that there is more heterogene-
ity across individuals than across countries, albeit with quantitative differences
across parameters. The country dummies capture relatively little of the overall
heterogeneity for the pessimism/optimism parameters, with 13.3% of the vari-
ance in pessimism for gains explained by the country dummies, and only 6.4% of
the variance in optimism for losses. This increases to over 30% for the sensitivity
parameters, with similar figures obtaining for loss aversion and noise.
Further adding individual characteristics to the regression does not increase
the explained variance by much, as is apparent from figure 5. Notwithstanding
8There are two such curves, corrsponding to the estimations with and without individual
characteristics added. The two differ slightly, and we show them both for reasons of precision.
The two curves, however, can be seen to largely coincide, and indeed there are no significant
differences between them.
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Figure 5: Observable versus unobservable heterogeneity, individual characteristics
Dashed lines are estimated parameter distributions taking observed and unobserved heterogeneity into account. Solid
grey lines represent the observed heterogeneity only and neglect the unobserved part. Densities are kernel density
estimates over individuals.
our more flexible model, which can account for a richer array of within-subject
heterogeneity through reference-dependence and likelihood-dependence, our con-
clusions thus remain remarkably similar to those reached by von Gaudecker et
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al. (2011). Observable characteristics at the individual level contribute little to
explaining overall heterogeneity in risk preferences.
This narrative changes once we start examining to what extent we can ex-
plain between-country heterogeneity recurring to a few macroeconomic indicators
rather than to country-specific dummies. Specifically, we will use the macroeco-
nomic indicators used above, that is, GDP per capita, the Gini coefficient, and
the private university and OPEC dummies. We also control for female since the
proportion of females in the experiment differs between countries. Figure 6 shows
the distribution of parameters estimated based on macroeconomic indicators, and
again compares this to the benchmark of heterogeneity captured by country dum-
mies. Just like above, the outermost curves represent the overall heterogeneity in
the two estimations, while the peaked curves correspond to distributions of pref-
erence parameters implied by the observed covariates only. Comparison between
the two peaked curves shows what is lost in terms of explained heterogeneity
when moving from country dummies to macroeconomics indicators.
While obviouslly capturing less heterogeneity than the country dummies, the
macroeconomic variables capture a substantial part of that heterogenity, ranging
from 43% to 70% of the heterogeneity captured by country dummies. Once again,
this exercise is least successful for pessimism and optimism, although still captur-
ing more than half of the variance captured by country dummies for pessimism
and close to 40% for optimism (see Online Appendix for the exact figures). This
stands in contrast to the effect found for the individual characteristics. We thus
conclude that while the characteristics we observe at the individual level explain
only a very small part of the overall heterogeneity between individuals, macroe-
conomic characteristics pick up on most of the between country differences.
7 Conclusion
We used data from 30 countries and 2939 subjects to systematically examine
differences in risk preferences across individuals and countries. Notwithstand-
ing the flexible descriptive model of choice under risk, observable characteristics
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Figure 6: Observable versus unobservable heterogeneity, country-specific dummies and
macroeconomic indicators
Light grey lines are estimated parameter distributions taking observed and unobserved heterogeneity into account.
Dark grey lines represent the observed heterogeneity only and neglect the unobserved part. Densities are kernel
density estimates over individuals.
were found to explain little of the total heterogeneity in preference parameters.
This may be an indication that risk preferences constitute an individual trait
that is largely independent of observable characteristics of the decision maker.
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Macroeconomic characteristics of countries, on the other hand, could capture
a large proportion of the overall between-country heterogeneity. We further ex-
cluded systematic selection effects by showing that the effects found in the poorest
country in our sample, Ethiopia, carries over to a representative sample of the
rural population of that country (Vieider et al., 2016).
In terms of country-level data, we observed both universal patterns and sys-
tematic differences. In particular, we found the qualitative patterns of likelihood-
insensitivity and reference-dependence to be universal, albeit with some quanti-
tative differences between countries. Therefore, we would expect the economic
phenomena related to probability weighting and sign-dependence, such as for
example the disposition effect, overweighting of small-probability losses in insur-
ance choices, and many of the anomalies observed in behavioral finance, to be
universal. The most important difference between countries consisted in poorer
countries showing systematically higher levels of risk tolerance than richer coun-
tries. This finding is indeed surprising, since scholars have to date generally
assumed poor countries to be less risk tolerant based on within-country results
showing risk aversion to decrease in income or wealth (see e.g. Haushofer and
Fehr, 2014, for a recent literature review reaching that conclusion).
In terms of observable characteristics, we could replicate and further qualify
typical findings in the literature, such as gender effects and effects of physical
height. Indeed, while there is a considerable literature discussing the effect of
such characteristics on overall risk aversion (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Dohmen
et al., 2011; Filippin and Crosetto, 2015), we have shown that the strongest effects
register in terms of reduced sensitivity for women. We drew similar conclusions
for GPA, which again was found to correlate most strongly with sensitivity. The
latter results seem in agreement with conclusions presented by Andersson et al.
(2016), according to which cognitive ability influences mostly error terms, but
shows no correlation with overall preferences if choice lists are balanced.
This leaves the question of what may be ultimately driving the negative
between-country correlation of aggregate risk tolerance with GDP per capita.
The latter may appear puzzling in light of the prevalent finding of a positive
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correlation between risk tolerance and income at the individual level (Donkers,
Melenberg and Van Soest, 2001; Dohmen et al., 2011; Gloede, Menkhoff and
Waibel, 2015; Hopland et al., 2013; Vieider et al., 2013; 2016). Several recent
papers have modeled economic growth as a function of risk tolerance (Galor and
Michalopoulos, 2012; Doepke and Zilibotti, 2014; Klasing, 2014). In these mod-
els, risk preferences are endogenously shaped by market forces, and the models
of Galor and Michalopoulos (2012) and Doepke and Zilibotti (2014) in particular
predict the type of relationship between risk tolerance and GDP per capita found
in this paper (see Bouchouicha and Vieider, 2017b, for a detailed discussion).
More research is needed in order to determine which mechanism in particular
may be driving these effects.
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A Characteristics country by country
Table A.1: Number of subjects per country and principal characteristics
country Sub.s For.s age male econ math natural hum arts social PPP/e language University GDP Gini
Australia 61 6 25.41 0.656 0.262 0.180 0.131 0.098 0.049 0.033 2 AUD English University of Adelaide 39,466 .305
Belgium 91 13 20.64 0.451 0.418 0.055 0.088 0.066 0.022 0.132 e1 French University of Liege 38,633 .280
Brazil 84 1 20.86 0.683 0.964 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 2 Real Portuguese Escola de Administraão, São Paolo 11,719 .547
Cambodia 80 0 20.74 0.375 0.000 0.212 0.237 0.125 0.175 0.175 1500 Riel Khmer University of Phnom Penh 2,373 .444
Chile 96 0 21.46 0.479 0.000 0.000 0.229 0.000 0.000 0.260 500 Pesos Spanish Universidad de Conception 17,125 .521
China 204 0 21.55 0.608 0.127 0.451 0.181 0.083 0.005 0.064 4 RMB Chinese Jiao Tong, Shanghai 8,442 .480
Colombia 128 0 21.21 0.500 0.062 0.797 0.047 0.031 0.023 0.008 1500 Pesos Spanish Universidad de Medellin 10,103 .560
Costa Rica 106 5 22.71 0.666 0.292 0.179 0.113 0.009 0.019 0.132 500 Colones Spanish Universidad de Costa Rica, San Jose 12,236 .503
Czech Rep. 99 2 22.38 0.606 0.485 0.111 0.051 0.121 0.030 0.091 20 Kronas Czech Charles University, Prague 25,949 .310
Ethiopia 140 1 21.14 0.657 0.593 0.107 0.079 0.021 0.000 0.093 6 Birr English Addis Ababa University 1,116 .300
France 93 8 21.30 0.527 0.430 0.054 0.022 0.043 0.032 0.032 e1 French University of Rennes 1 35,194 .327
Germany 130 32 26.52 0.515 0.115 0.400 0.108 0.115 0.008 0.023 e1 German Technical University, Berlin 39,414 .270
Guatemala 84 1 22.20 0.464 0.345 0.179 0.000 0.119 0.036 0.131 6 Quetzales Spanish Universidad Francisco Marroquín 4,961 .559
India 89 0 21.01 0.303 0.697 0.000 0.022 0.112 0.090 0.034 22 Rupees English University of Kolkata 3,650 .368
Japan 84 0 21.74 0.512 0.095 0.417 0.107 0.107 0.000 0.048 120 Yen Japanese Hiroshima Shudo University 34,278 .376
Kyrgyzstan 97 2 20.02 0.485 0.639 0.000 0.000 0.072 0.000 0.289 25 KGS Russian University of Bishkek 2,424 .362
Malaysia 64 0 20.09 0.578 0.578 0.188 0.062 0.000 0.016 0.047 2 Ringgit English University of Nottingham Malaysia 15,589 .462
Nicaragua 120 1 20.94 0.550 0.917 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 10 Córdobas Spanish Universidad National Autonoma 2,940 .405
Nigeria 202 2 22.65 0.495 0.406 0.000 0.005 0.054 0.312 0.119 110 Naira English University of Lagos 2,532 .437
Peru 95 1 23.66 0.463 0.579 0.368 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.042 2 N. Soles Spanish Instituto del Peru 10,318 .460
Poland 89 1 24.00 0.517 0.427 0.079 0.067 0.169 0.000 0.124 2.4 Zloty Polish University of Warsaw 21,281 .341
Russia 70 8 20.56 0.500 0.729 0.129 0.000 0.086 0.000 0.014 22 Rubles Russian Higher School of Economics 21,358 .420
Saudi Arabia 65 12 21.74 1.000 0.585 0.308 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 4 Riyal English King Fahd University 24,434 .570
South Africa 71 18 22.44 0.606 0.451 0.254 0.056 0.056 0.014 0.042 8 Rand English University of Cape Town 11,035 .650
Spain 80 3 20.94 0.513 0.450 0.037 0.000 0.100 0.037 0.225 e1 Spanish Universidad Pompeu Fabra 32,701 .320
Thailand 79 0 20.59 0.354 0.329 0.101 0.139 0.000 0.013 0.215 20 Baht Thai University of Khon Kaen 8,703 .536
Tunisia 74 0 22.26 0.527 0.230 0.473 0.081 0.000 0.000 0.000 2 Dinar French Universite Libre de Tunis 9,415 .400
UK 80 0 20.77 0.450 0.700 0.000 0.025 0.013 0.025 0.075 1 Pound English King’s College London 36,511 .350
USA 97 22 21.32 0.495 0.144 0.206 0.113 0.041 0.031 0.186 $ 1 English University of Michigan Ann Arbor 48,442 .450
Vietnam 87 0 20.20 0.575 0.667 0.057 0.034 0.000 0.011 0.023 8000 Dong Vietnamese Ho-Chi-Minh-City University 3,435 .357
Total 2939 139 21.83 0.530 0.402 0.189 0.069 0.056 0.040 0.089
Sub.s stands for number of subjects, For.s for number of foreigners; econ etc. indicate study majors; PPP/eindicates exchange rates in purchasing power parity used for conversion
Gini coefficients are taken from the World Bank where available, else from the CIA World Factbook; 2011 or closest available
GDP refers to 2011 values in PPP, current US Dollars; source: World Bank
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APPENDIX FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION
A Country fixed effects
N=2939, LL = −214, 609 α+ β+ α− β− λ σ
Australia -0.077 0.007 -0.102* -0.106*** -0.115 0.017
(0.049) (0.059) (0.057) (0.039) (0.126) (0.013)
Belgium -0.010 -0.076* -0.101* -0.058 0.057 0.017*
(0.044) (0.041) (0.056) (0.039) (0.124) (0.010)
Brazil -0.027 -0.174*** -0.029 -0.033 0.127 0.021**
(0.042) (0.043) (0.051) (0.037) (0.120) (0.009)
Cambodia -0.236*** -0.182*** -0.424*** 0.217*** 0.902*** 0.097***
(0.060) (0.047) (0.071) (0.057) (0.231) (0.009)
Chile -0.190*** -0.082* -0.136** -0.088** -0.002 0.051***
(0.049) (0.048) (0.054) (0.044) (0.109) (0.010)
China -0.056 -0.088*** -0.105** -0.045 0.102 -0.000
(0.036) (0.032) (0.044) (0.031) (0.103) (0.008)
Colombia -0.095* -0.116*** -0.075 0.043 0.517*** 0.057***
(0.054) (0.044) (0.058) (0.041) (0.144) (0.011)
Costarica -0.119** -0.086** -0.116** 0.047 0.254* 0.072***
(0.055) (0.043) (0.054) (0.043) (0.137) (0.010)
Czech -0.017 -0.063* 0.010 -0.044 -0.086 -0.022***
(0.040) (0.036) (0.046) (0.034) (0.106) (0.008)
Ethiopia -0.160*** -0.304*** -0.336*** 0.049 0.850*** 0.077***
(0.046) (0.041) (0.051) (0.043) (0.160) (0.009)
France -0.100** -0.092** -0.024 -0.010 0.125 0.034***
(0.046) (0.045) (0.052) (0.043) (0.117) (0.009)
Germany -0.041 0.012 -0.038 -0.015 -0.141 0.024**
(0.043) (0.041) (0.050) (0.037) (0.103) (0.010)
Guatemala 0.049 -0.118** 0.142* 0.190*** 0.071 0.088***
(0.057) (0.058) (0.077) (0.056) (0.137) (0.013)
India -0.290*** -0.072 -0.306*** 0.175*** 0.912*** 0.088***
(0.054) (0.051) (0.062) (0.052) (0.230) (0.010)
Japan -0.012 -0.095** 0.022 -0.013 0.151 -0.004
(0.046) (0.040) (0.049) (0.039) (0.122) (0.010)
Kyrgyzstan -0.055 -0.167*** -0.273*** 0.063 0.215 0.066***
(0.053) (0.042) (0.060) (0.046) (0.140) (0.009)
Malaysia -0.070 -0.181*** -0.205*** -0.063 0.599*** 0.055***
(0.055) (0.050) (0.068) (0.054) (0.218) (0.012)
Nicaragua -0.191*** -0.358*** -0.364*** 0.052 1.269*** 0.167***
(0.061) (0.042) (0.057) (0.058) (0.277) (0.009)
Nigeria -0.515*** -0.355*** -0.595*** -0.010 1.146*** 0.191***
(0.045) (0.039) (0.049) (0.052) (0.244) (0.008)
Peru -0.222*** -0.315*** -0.275*** -0.000 0.538*** 0.110***
(0.056) (0.046) (0.064) (0.053) (0.181) (0.012)
Poland -0.086* -0.063 -0.067 0.036 0.111 0.011
(0.051) (0.041) (0.052) (0.038) (0.123) (0.010)
Russia -0.059 -0.091* -0.091 0.095** 0.397** 0.021
(0.048) (0.047) (0.057) (0.047) (0.194) (0.013)
Saudi -0.092* -0.297*** -0.165*** -0.045 0.529*** 0.032***
(0.054) (0.044) (0.063) (0.045) (0.171) (0.011)
South Africa -0.100* -0.060 -0.127** 0.055 0.171 0.056***
(0.051) (0.051) (0.062) (0.055) (0.143) (0.013)
Spain 0.023 -0.054 -0.051 -0.042 0.019 0.001
(0.049) (0.040) (0.050) (0.041) (0.111) (0.010)
Thailand 0.037 -0.105** 0.038 0.074 0.383** 0.047***
(0.056) (0.051) (0.057) (0.048) (0.161) (0.010)
Tunisia -0.246*** -0.169*** -0.329*** 0.009 0.470*** 0.098***
(0.058) (0.050) (0.069) (0.058) (0.172) (0.011)
UK 0.082 -0.228*** -0.246*** 0.101** 1.251*** 0.028***
(0.053) (0.038) (0.064) (0.044) (0.213) (0.010)
Vietnam -0.119** -0.217*** -0.102* 0.030 0.212* 0.034***
(0.049) (0.041) (0.053) (0.042) (0.123) (0.009)
female -0.121*** 0.041*** -0.090*** -0.043*** -0.030 0.016***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.039) (0.003)
loss -0.004**
(0.002)
constant 0.785*** 1.046*** 0.870*** 0.945*** 1.607*** 0.156***
(0.031) (0.027) (0.037) (0.026) (0.085) (0.007)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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B Cultural attitudes and religion
In this section we look at socio-cultural factors in the determination of risk pref-
erences. As usual we control for country dummies, as well as the physical factors
described above, in all the regressions. We start by considering the cultural atti-
tude scales developed by Hofstede (1980), measured at the individual level in the
final questionnaire.9 The effects are reported in table A.1. Somewhat surpris-
ingly, given discussions in the previous literature (Rieger et al., 2015; Weber and
Hsee, 1998), effects seem to range from weak to non-existent. The only effects
that are significant at the 5% level is slightly more pessimism by subjects rank-
ing high on power distance, and some effects for masculinity. There is, however,
also a marginally significant correlation of the pessimism parameter for gains
with uncertainty avoidance, going in the expected direction of more uncertainty
avoidance being associated with higher pessimism.
Table A.1: Effects of cultural characteristics on risk preferences
N=2939, LL = −214, 015 α+ β+ α− β− λ σ
individualism 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.003* 0.005 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.000)
uncertainty avoidance 0.003 0.004* 0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.000)
power distance -0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.004** -0.006 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.000)
masculinity 0.003 -0.006*** 0.001 0.004* 0.013** -0.001***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.000)
demographics X X X X X X
country fixed effects X X X X X X
constant 0.659*** 1.052*** 0.844*** 0.896*** 1.492*** 0.163***
(0.072) (0.061) (0.077) (0.059) (0.198) (0.014)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
We next discuss the effects of religion, shown in table A.2. The usual caveat
of how we can only show correlations—not causal effects—of course continues to
apply. However, the religious affiliation we use here—in opposition to the inten-
9Examples of questions aimed at detecting the respondents’ cultural attitudes are “It is more
important for men to have a professional career than it is for women” (masculinity); "Individuals
should sacrifice self-interest for the group that they belong to" (individualism); "Standardized
work procedures are helpful" (uncertainty avoidance); or "People in lower positions should not
disagree with decisions made by people in higher positions" (power distance); a complete list
can be found in the instructions. People are asked to indicate on a 5-point scale whether they
agree or disagree with the statement.
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sity of religious belief often discussed in the literature—is plausibly determined
by upbringing. This makes it unlikely that the choice of religious affiliation is
determined by risk preferences, except perhaps for the choice of being atheist.
The latter is related with marginally significantly lower levels of noise. We can-
not replicate previous findings in the literature according to which Catholics are
more risk tolerant than Protestants (see Barsky et al., 1997; Noussair et al., 2013,
but see also Dohmen et al., 2011 for evidence to the contrary).
Table A.2: Effects of religious affiliation on risk preferences
N=2937, LL = −213, 922 α+ β+ α− β− λ σ
atheist 0.033 -0.037 0.050 0.022 0.029 -0.011*
(0.028) (0.025) (0.033) (0.027) (0.076) (0.006)
catholic 0.030 -0.022 0.032 0.017 0.017 -0.004
(0.030) (0.028) (0.034) (0.029) (0.081) (0.006)
orthodox 0.048 0.056 -0.013 0.110** 0.255 0.012
(0.047) (0.042) (0.052) (0.050) (0.176) (0.009)
muslim 0.044 0.003 -0.071 0.042 0.122 0.012
(0.044) (0.036) (0.057) (0.041) (0.135) (0.008)
jewish -0.060 -0.144** -0.213** -0.040 0.362* -0.003
(0.089) (0.061) (0.087) (0.067) (0.214) (0.019)
hindu -0.081 0.037 -0.082 0.029 -0.219 -0.008
(0.083) (0.067) (0.084) (0.077) (0.225) (0.016)
buddist 0.023 -0.031 0.032 0.111** 0.109 0.004
(0.048) (0.042) (0.051) (0.046) (0.135) (0.010)
religion_other 0.015 -0.044 -0.018 -0.003 0.055 0.006
(0.035) (0.032) (0.040) (0.032) (0.092) (0.008)
demographics X X X X X X
country fixed effects X X X X X X
constant 0.761*** 1.086*** 0.865*** 0.922*** 1.590*** 0.165***
(0.040) (0.033) (0.046) (0.032) (0.112) (0.009)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Orthodox participants display increased sensitivity for losses relative to the
reference group of Protestants, as do Buddhists. The strongest effects, however,
are observed for Jews, who are less pessimistic for gains, exhibit less sensitivity
for losses, and are marginally significantly more loss averse than Protestants. The
finding of higher risk tolerance for gains is consistent with the finding for the US
by Barsky et al. (1997). One potential explanation is that Jewish families tend
on average to be more affluent than the average family, so that the effect we ob-
serve for being Jewish is really an income effect. Disentangling this relationship,
however, is not possible based on our data alone.
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C Comparison of countries including confidence bands
Below we include graphs of pairwise comparisons between the countries included
in the examples of ‘typical weighting functions’ in the main text, for both gains
and losses. Confidence bands express 95% confidence throughout, and are based
















D Full prospect theory specification
In this section, we examine the stability of our results to using a fully flexible
function including domain-specific utility as well as probability weighting. We










if x ≤ 0,
(13)
with µ > 0 (µ < 0) indicating concave (convex) utility for gains, and ν > 0
(ν < 0) indicating convex (concave) utility for losses. Exponential utility has
the advantage of reducing issues of collinearity between utility and probability
weighting, and it reduces issues with the identification of loss aversion using power
utility (see Wakker, 2010, section 9.6). It is thus better suited in our case than
alternative functions such as the power utility (see also Choi, Fisman, Gale and
Kariv, 2007).
D.1 Country level parameters
We start by representing utility curvature in figure A.1. Panel 1(a) shows some
typical utility functions, while panel 1(b) shows a scatter plot of the utility param-
eters for gains and losses. For gains, we almost universally find slightly concave
utility, with the exception of Nigeria, where utility is somewhat convex (although
not significantly so). There appears to be a tendency for industrialized countries
to exhibit more pronounced utility curvature, with Germany, France, Belgium
and the US amongst the countries with the most concave utility functions for
gains (India is an obvious outlier in this group). At the opposite end of the
spectrum, we find countries such as Guatemala, Malaysia, Ethiopia, and Tunisia
in addition to the already mentioned Nigeria, all of which are low or middle in-
come countries. For losses the patterns are more varied, with convex, linear, and
concave utility all occurring in the data.
Figure A.2 plots the parameters of the probability weighting function for gains

































































































(b) Scatter plot of parameters
Figure A.1: Utility functions
ity. This is reflected in very regular changes in the weighting function parameters
relative to those shown above. Panel 2(a) shows the changes undergone by the
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sensitivity parameter α+. The sensitivity parameter becomes slightly larger for
all countries but Nigeria once we allow for utility curvature. Furthermore, the two
values of the sensitivity parameter we observe for the prospect theory model and
the piecewise linear utility model are highly correlated at r = 0.993, p < 0.001.
We observe similarly regular changes for the pessimism parameter β+, shown
in panel 2(b). Allowing for utility curvature reduces the value of β+ in all cases
(again with the exception of Nigeria). This is indeed to be expected, since part
of the risk tolerance is now picked up in utility curvature. This is shown clearly
when one correlates the difference between the two pessimism parameters ob-
tained under the two models and the utility curvature parameter. The resulting
correlation is r = 0.988, p < 0.001, showing a direct relationship between the risk
tolerance picked up by the utility function and the amount of risk tolerance lost
in the passimism parameter.
The corresponding parameters for losses are shown in figure A.3. Differences
in the sensitivity parameter, shown in panel 3(a), are small. They go in both
directions, reflecting the less regular patterns seen for the utility functions. A
similar conclusion holds for the optimism parameter for losses, shown in panel
3(b). Once again, we find these deviations to be highly correlated with the utility
parameter for losses at r = 0.999, p < 0.001. We also observe high degrees of
collinearity between the utility parameter and the optimism parameter even for
this relatively simple model, with a correlation of r = −0.699, p < 0.001. This
is likely due to the higher levels of noise we observe for losses, which makes the
separation of these parameters more difficult.
The main issue when estimating the full PT model relative to estimating the
simplified version in the main text derive from collinearity in the estimation of
utility curvature and the pessimism/optimism parameters. This issue derives
from noise in the responses, and increases in 1/N. This means that the issue
is confounded the smaller the groups become in regression analysis. If we esti-
mate the model at the country level, we do not find major collinearity issues for
gains, as shown by the insignificant correlation between the utility curvature and
pessimism parameters (r = 0.017, p = 0.928). The problem is, however, severe
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mean of alpha mean of alpha_pt
(a) Parameter comparison alpha































mean of beta mean of beta_pt
(b) Parameter comparison beta
Figure A.2: Probability weighting functions for gains, parameter comparison
for losses, where the correlation between utility curvature and optimism is very
large and highly significant (r = −0.747, p < 0.001). The fact that we observe
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mean of gamma mean of gamma_pt
(a) Typical utility functions































mean of delta mean of delta_pt
(b) Scatter plot of parameters
Figure A.3: Probability weighting functions for losses, parameter comparison
this issue mainly for losses may well be driven by the higher noise levels in this
decision domain. Table A.3 shows the regression on country dummies of the full
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prospect theory model.
Table A.3: Country effects, prospect theory
utility function weighting gains weighting losses
µ ν λ α+ β+ α− β−
Australia -0.007 -0.020* -0.099 -0.094* 0.038 -0.121** -0.013
(0.010) (0.011) (0.111) (0.053) (0.068) (0.058) (0.067)
Belgium 0.003 -0.027** -0.054 -0.011 -0.082 -0.128** 0.068
(0.009) (0.010) (0.107) (0.050) (0.050) (0.057) (0.069)
Brazil 0.002 -0.020* 0.001 -0.033 -0.160*** -0.050 0.063
(0.010) (0.012) (0.108) (0.045) (0.056) (0.052) (0.068)
Cambodia -0.020* 0.005 0.887*** -0.287*** -0.074 -0.420*** 0.189**
(0.010) (0.016) (0.220) (0.066) (0.055) (0.071) (0.095)
Chile -0.003 -0.011 -0.009 -0.216*** -0.057 -0.147*** -0.036
(0.009) (0.011) (0.098) (0.054) (0.058) (0.054) (0.067)
China -0.019*** -0.003 0.194** -0.096** 0.012 -0.108** -0.030
(0.007) (0.009) (0.090) (0.040) (0.042) (0.045) (0.052)
Colombia -0.007 -0.012 0.443*** -0.115* -0.071 -0.089 0.102
(0.009) (0.012) (0.143) (0.063) (0.050) (0.061) (0.070)
Costarica -0.002 0.035*** 0.277** -0.136** -0.068 -0.067 -0.111*
(0.009) (0.011) (0.117) (0.061) (0.057) (0.057) (0.062)
Czech -0.005 -0.014 -0.089 -0.032 -0.035 -0.006 0.023
(0.008) (0.009) (0.092) (0.044) (0.044) (0.047) (0.055)
Ethiopia -0.026*** 0.006 0.921*** -0.218*** -0.159*** -0.330*** 0.020
(0.008) (0.010) (0.151) (0.050) (0.048) (0.051) (0.065)
France 0.006 -0.032*** -0.017 -0.102** -0.106** -0.059 0.149**
(0.010) (0.012) (0.108) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.073)
Germany 0.013 -0.013 -0.205** -0.023 -0.046 -0.053 0.046
(0.009) (0.010) (0.085) (0.049) (0.051) (0.050) (0.060)
Guatemala -0.030*** 0.009 0.286** 0.000 0.035 0.160** 0.143
(0.010) (0.013) (0.146) (0.061) (0.072) (0.077) (0.089)
India 0.013 0.069*** 0.614*** -0.308*** -0.116** -0.211*** -0.134*
(0.012) (0.015) (0.166) (0.061) (0.055) (0.067) (0.073)
Japan -0.001 -0.008 0.088 -0.018 -0.079* 0.013 0.023
(0.009) (0.011) (0.110) (0.049) (0.048) (0.051) (0.066)
Kyrgyzstan -0.006 0.037** 0.296*** -0.077 -0.120** -0.229*** -0.106
(0.009) (0.015) (0.115) (0.059) (0.055) (0.064) (0.076)
Malaysia -0.024*** -0.001 0.661*** -0.118** -0.055 -0.206*** -0.060
(0.009) (0.013) (0.198) (0.059) (0.062) (0.068) (0.093)
Nicaragua -0.011 0.027* 1.065*** -0.239*** -0.269*** -0.338*** -0.076
(0.010) (0.014) (0.235) (0.066) (0.056) (0.061) (0.084)
Nigeria -0.048*** -0.018 1.500*** -0.595*** -0.114** -0.606*** 0.076
(0.009) (0.013) (0.276) (0.047) (0.055) (0.049) (0.081)
Peru -0.017* 0.005 0.543*** -0.270*** -0.203*** -0.270*** -0.025
(0.010) (0.013) (0.161) (0.062) (0.056) (0.066) (0.080)
Poland -0.009 -0.011 0.119 -0.110** -0.014 -0.081 0.091
(0.009) (0.010) (0.106) (0.053) (0.052) (0.053) (0.064)
Russia -0.007 0.000 0.353** -0.079 -0.048 -0.090 0.092
(0.009) (0.012) (0.155) (0.052) (0.057) (0.059) (0.073)
Saudi -0.011 0.006 0.493*** -0.126** -0.213*** -0.158** -0.072
(0.009) (0.013) (0.169) (0.060) (0.053) (0.064) (0.067)
Southafrica -0.004 0.029** 0.224* -0.118** -0.032 -0.087 -0.079
(0.010) (0.014) (0.122) (0.057) (0.065) (0.064) (0.082)
Spain -0.005 -0.019* -0.006 0.012 -0.025 -0.072 0.047
(0.008) (0.011) (0.099) (0.053) (0.049) (0.050) (0.062)
Thailand -0.004 -0.020 0.273* 0.028 -0.078 0.012 0.173**
(0.011) (0.013) (0.151) (0.064) (0.061) (0.059) (0.087)
Tunisia -0.026** 0.030** 0.633*** -0.302*** -0.033 -0.298*** -0.125
(0.010) (0.014) (0.170) (0.062) (0.063) (0.073) (0.080)
UK -0.002 -0.018 0.943*** 0.072 -0.189*** -0.265*** 0.192***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.179) (0.060) (0.047) (0.063) (0.072)
Vietnam 0.000 0.013 0.171 -0.138** -0.188*** -0.085 -0.033
(0.010) (0.012) (0.118) (0.054) (0.054) (0.056) (0.073)
female 0.011*** 0.003 -0.074* -0.112*** -0.011 -0.085*** -0.054**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.040) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.025)
constant (USA) 0.041*** 0.001 1.310*** 0.858*** 0.834*** 0.871*** 0.939***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.066) (0.035) (0.036) (0.038) (0.044)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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D.2 Descriptive country comparison
In this section we provide some graphs completing the evidence regarding utility
curvature. We start by showing the probability weighting functions estimated
when utility is potentially nonlinear. The weighting functions for gains are shown
in figure A.4. Panel 4(a) shows some typical probability weighting functions
(corresponding to the same countries as those shown in the main text). The
functions are now generally more elevated, due to the concave utility function
capturing part of the overall risk tolerance. Some rankings are also change relative
to the main text, for instance, Vietnam now sports a less pessimistic function than
Ethiopia. This is obviously due to the higher concavity of the utility function in
Vietnam, and illustrates the difficulties in assessing overall risk preferences from
the complete PT specification. Panel 4(b) shows a scatter plot of the parameter
values. This confirms first of all that the pessimism parameters have moved
considerably to the left relative to the graph shown in the main text, due the
concave utility functions. The overall trends between countries appear to remain
similar, but are now somewhat more difficult to detect (regression analysis below
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beta gains (pessimism)
(b) Scatter plot of parameters
Figure A.4: Probability weighting functions for gains, full PT specification
This leaves the weighting functions for losses to be discussed, which are shown
in figure A.5, with panel 5(a) showing the same functions as in the man text, and
panel 5(b) providing a scatter plot of the parameters. The patterns appear quite
similar to those shown in the main text, if perhaps somewhat accentuated. This
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is because the utility functions do not move preferences in a uniform direction
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(b) Scatter plot of parameters
Figure A.5: Probability weighting functions for losses, full PT specification
D.3 Regression analysis using full PT model
Let us now move on to the regression analysis using the full PT model. Table
A.4 shows the income regression. The effects from the main text emerge intact
from this exercise. Countries with a lower GDP per capita tend to exhibit lower
sensitivity and less pessimism for gains. This effect is now reinforced by less
concave utility for gains. They also tend to be more loss averse. The one difference
emerges for losses, where we find the greatest collinearity issues. Here we now
find a marginally significant decrease in optimism. This is, however, compensated
by a much more convex utility function in poorer countries. Other effects fare
similarly, and are not discussed in detail.
Table A.4: Income effects, prospect theory
utility function weighting gains weighting losses
µ ν λ α β γ δ σ
GDP difference -0.006*** 0.011*** 0.221*** -0.072*** -0.030*** -0.083*** -0.022* 0.033***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.022) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.002)
foreigner -0.002 0.009 0.028 0.025 0.008 0.003 -0.017 0.019*
(0.006) (0.008) (0.077) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.045) (0.007)
Gini coeff. -0.002 0.003 0.008 0.010 0.015* 0.043*** -0.006 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.021) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.002)
private university -0.003 0.008 0.104 0.007 -0.039 -0.038 -0.076 -0.000
(0.004) (0.007) (0.077) (0.029) (0.026) (0.033) (0.039) (0.005)
OPEC -0.024*** -0.023** 0.633*** -0.300*** -0.030 -0.293*** 0.055 0.065***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.168) (0.032) (0.035) (0.032) (0.051) (0.006)
female X X X X X X X X
constant 0.044*** -0.015*** 1.250*** 0.849*** 0.793*** 0.861*** 0.986*** 0.155***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.039) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.004)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
67
Table A.5 shows the effects of physical characteristics using the full PT model.
Women are again found to display less sensitivity than men for both gains and
losses. We also replicate the finding of women being more noisy. The increased
utility curvature for gains indicates that women are indeed also less risk tolerant
than men—an effect that now emerges more strongly than in the reduced model
in the main text. There is a much smaller effect going in the same direction for
losses, which is marginally significant and captured by the optimism parameter.
We also replicate the same effects for hight already discussed in the main text.
Table A.5: Individual effects, prospect theory
utility function weighting gains weighting losses
µ ν λ α β γ δ σ
female 0.013*** 0.007 -0.092* -0.079*** -0.024 -0.063*** -0.053* 0.011***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.051) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.031) (0.004)
age (z-score) -0.001 0.002 0.028 -0.010 0.009 0.012 0.006 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.021) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.002)
height (z-score) 0.002 0.004 -0.021 0.030*** -0.015 0.020* 0.003 -0.005**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.029) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.002)
constant 0.039*** -0.002 1.328*** 0.836*** 0.849*** 0.861*** 0.940*** 0.159***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.070) (0.036) (0.038) (0.039) (0.044) (0.007)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table A.6 shows the effects of study characteristics in the full PT model. Once
again, the effects we observe are very similar to those presented in the main text.
In terms of GPA, we find the same effects in terms of sensitivity as before. The
effect on pessimism again goes in the direction of an increased GPA correlating
with higher levels of pessimism (and thus against the effect pointed out in the
early literature). This effect is now captured in utility curvature, and significant
at the 5% level. We further replicate the effects of study major reported in the
main text.
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Table A.6: Study characteristics, prospect theory
utility function weighting gains weighting losses
µ ν λ α β γ δ σ
GPA (z-score) 0.003** 0.001 -0.065*** 0.036*** -0.002 0.043*** -0.013 -0.007***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.023) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.015) (0.002)
mathemathics and engineering -0.001 0.011* -0.024 0.003 -0.003 0.045* -0.025 -0.004
(0.004) (0.006) (0.066) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.033) (0.005)
natural sciences 0.007 0.002 -0.124 -0.031 -0.022 -0.066* -0.038 0.007
(0.007) (0.008) (0.084) (0.032) (0.040) (0.035) (0.044) (0.006)
medicine -0.001 0.021** -0.036 0.030 0.007 0.010 -0.149*** -0.002
(0.008) (0.010) (0.090) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.055) (0.008)
social sciences (not econ) 0.003 -0.001 -0.027 -0.094*** 0.010 -0.096*** -0.012 0.017***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.067) (0.030) (0.035) (0.030) (0.045) (0.005)
humanities 0.005 0.008 0.009 -0.076** -0.020 -0.013 -0.028 0.017***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.091) (0.034) (0.041) (0.038) (0.043) (0.007)
arts -0.007 0.022 0.236 -0.058 -0.022 -0.106** -0.098 0.021**
(0.010) (0.017) (0.147) (0.053) (0.060) (0.050) (0.101) (0.009)
study other -0.005 0.009 0.020 -0.079*** 0.034 -0.039 -0.058 0.017***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.067) (0.026) (0.034) (0.028) (0.040) (0.005)
constant 0.034*** -0.010 1.423*** 0.837*** 0.862*** 0.846*** 0.995*** 0.158***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.089) (0.040) (0.047) (0.042) (0.053) (0.008)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
E Random parameter estimations—statistical details
In this section, we provide additional evidence on our random parameter model.
We estimate the random parameter model with an empty set of covariates, i.e
without any observable source of heterogeneity between individuals or countries
added to the model. The coefficients for this model are shown in Table A.7. The
coefficients have been obtained following equation (12). The ‘constant’ and the
diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix indicate the values of the
variables transformed back to the original scale (from the log-normal estimated)
by the delta method.
Table A.7: Estimated Parameters for Model without Covariates
N=2939, LL = −201, 848 α+ β+ α− β− λ σ
Constant 0.66*** 0.94*** 0.73*** 0.96*** 2.00*** 0.14***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.001)
diagonal elements of Ω 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.68*** 0.005***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.06) (0.001)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
We next take a look at heterogeneity between individuals. To this end, we
compare the model with no heterogeneity between individuals or countries to the
one with country dummies added, and to one with both country dummies and
individual characteristics added. The comparison of the baseline model with an
empty set of covariates to the more complex ones allows us to measure if the
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observed covariates can account for heterogeneity in estimated parameters. Fol-
lowing von Gaudecker et al. (2011), we compare the distributions of preference
parameters implied by the observed covariates only to the overall distributions
(i.e. the distributions incorporating all the heterogeneity, across observable char-
acteristics and unobservables). We also examine the extent to which the hetero-
geneity explained by adding the individual characteristics will be different than
the heterogeneity explained using the country dummies alone. Since the country
dummies capture all the between-country heterogeneity by definition, the dif-
ference between the curve obtained only based on country dummies and the one
obtained based on country dummies and observable individual characteristics will
give us the heterogeneity explained by the individual characteristics themselves.
Table A.8 shows the variance decomposition of the various preference param-
eters. The first row of the table indicates that country dummies explain only
a moderate proportion of the overall heterogeneity, especially for the two pes-
simism/optimism parameters, with 13.3% of the variance in pessimism for gains
explained by the country dummies, and only 6.4% of the variance in optimism for
losses. This improves to over 30% of the variance for the sensitivity parameters.
When it come to loss aversion and the noise term, somewhat more of their overall
heterogeneity can be explained by the country dummies alone. In general, we
conclude that there is more heterogeneity across individuals than across coun-
tries. Further adding individual characteristics to the regression, however, does
not increase the explained variance by much. Notwithstanding our more flexi-
ble model, which can account for a richer array of within-subject heterogeneity
through reference-dependence and likelihood-dependence, our conclusions thus
remain remarkably similar to the ones reached by von Gaudecker et al. (2011).
Observable characteristics at the individual level contribute little to explaining
overall heterogeneity in risk preferences.
Table A.8: Variance decomposition of preference parameters and heterogeneity between coun-
tries
N=2939 α+ β+ α− β− λ σ
country dummies 0.316 0.133 0.306 0.064 0.326 0.403
macro indicators 0.223 0.071 0.193 0.028 0.184 0.280
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The extent to which the variance explained by a random parameter model
based on macro indicators approaches the one explained by the country fixed
effects alone is measured by comparing explained versus unexplained between-
country heterogeneity. Table A.8 shows the decomposition of the overall variance
implied by country-specific dummies and by macroeconomic indicators. Table
A.9 shows an analogous decomposition at the individual level, showing that indi-
vidual level characteristics (captured by 11 dummy variables such as female, age,
height, GPA and study major) do not capture much in terms of heterogeneity.
Table A.9: Variance decomposition of preference parameters and heterogeneity between indi-
viduals
N=2939 α+ β+ α− β− λ σ
country dummies 0.277 0.101 0.236 0.065 0.255 0.359
individual characteristics 0.055 0.024 0.055 0.011 0.035 0.059
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F Stability of income correlations
In this section we add a number of potential explanatory macroeconomic variables
to the GDP variable in order to test for the stability of the latter. We take
these variables from the macroeconomics literature on growth and comparative
development. We start by inserting geographical variables, in particular, distance
from the equator in degrees (60nm), a dummy indicating whether a country is
landlocked, and continent dummies. The results are shown in table A.10. First
and foremost, all the effects discussed in the main text remain highly significant.
In addition, latitude also shows some significant effects, going in the direction of
participants at higher latitudes showing less noisy behavior, lower loss aversion,
and higher degrees of pessimism for gains.
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Table A.10: Effects of income measures on risk preferences, geographical controls
N=2939, LL = −215, 871 α+ β+ α− β− λ σ
GDP (diff. from US) -0.062*** -0.054*** -0.122*** 0.046*** 0.166*** 0.036***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.039) (0.003)
latitude (degrees) -0.000 0.001** -0.001 -0.000 -0.007*** -0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
landlocked 0.116*** 0.012 0.137*** -0.042* -0.254*** -0.049***
(0.028) (0.022) (0.029) (0.022) (0.073) (0.005)
foreigner 0.028 -0.002 0.002 0.029 0.027 0.015**
(0.033) (0.030) (0.039) (0.028) (0.086) (0.007)
Gini difference 0.472*** 0.250** 0.604*** 0.158 -0.452 -0.126***
(0.118) (0.112) (0.134) (0.111) (0.374) (0.027)
private university 0.011 -0.073*** -0.061** -0.032 0.068 0.005
(0.026) (0.023) (0.031) (0.025) (0.085) (0.006)
OPEC -0.219*** -0.163*** -0.215*** -0.053 0.335** 0.052***
(0.034) (0.029) (0.037) (0.036) (0.140) (0.006)
Africa -0.126*** 0.032 -0.081* -0.066* -0.077 0.011
(0.040) (0.035) (0.046) (0.035) (0.116) (0.009)
Asia -0.010 0.035 0.011 -0.053** -0.187** -0.028***
(0.029) (0.027) (0.033) (0.025) (0.081) (0.007)
Americas -0.092*** -0.015 -0.042 -0.061** -0.162* 0.017**
(0.035) (0.031) (0.041) (0.030) (0.094) (0.007)
Oceania -0.042 0.092* -0.050 -0.098*** -0.360*** -0.007
(0.043) (0.055) (0.049) (0.034) (0.113) (0.012)
female -0.122*** 0.047*** -0.099*** -0.035*** -0.019 0.020***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.041) (0.003)
loss -0.002
(0.002)
constant 0.840*** 0.951*** 0.982*** 0.949*** 2.001*** 0.169***
(0.051) (0.042) (0.059) (0.044) (0.142) (0.009)
* (p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01)
We next take a look at genetic diversity within a country, which has been
found to relate significantly to GDP per capita (Ashraf and Galor, 2013). We
use the predicted genetic diversity measures from that paper. The results are
shown in table A.11. Once again, the main effects discussed in the paper remain
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stable. The genetic diversity measures show some additional effects, most notably
on losses, loss aversion, and on noise—although they have no effect on gains.
Table A.11: Effects of income measures on risk preferences, genetic diversity
N=2939, LL = −215, 978 α+ β+ α− β− λ σ
GDP diff. from US -0.057*** -0.056*** -0.121*** 0.042*** 0.168*** 0.037***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.048) (0.003)
predicted diversity 0.443 1.699 -14.664** 14.552** 42.421** 8.152***
(6.531) (5.780) (7.025) (6.154) (19.425) (1.321)
pr. diversity sqaured 1.328 -0.685 12.374** -9.805** -31.908** -6.506***
(4.889) (4.312) (5.252) (4.639) (15.052) (0.992)
OPEC -0.285*** -0.185*** -0.290*** -0.075* 0.410** 0.084***
(0.037) (0.031) (0.038) (0.042) (0.167) (0.007)
private university 0.022 -0.072*** -0.073** -0.011 0.108 0.013**
(0.030) (0.025) (0.034) (0.027) (0.087) (0.006)
foreigner 0.008 -0.010 -0.016 0.016 0.016 0.019***
(0.034) (0.031) (0.040) (0.029) (0.083) (0.007)
Gini difference 0.417*** 0.247** 0.527*** 0.253** -0.120 -0.092***
(0.115) (0.111) (0.132) (0.110) (0.382) (0.027)
degrees latitude -0.000 0.001* -0.001 -0.001 -0.008*** -0.000***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000)
Africa -0.143*** 0.028 -0.109** -0.083** -0.075 0.018*
(0.042) (0.036) (0.048) (0.037) (0.123) (0.009)
Asia 0.052 0.058* 0.105** -0.052 -0.316*** -0.067***
(0.037) (0.033) (0.042) (0.033) (0.118) (0.008)
Americas 0.170** 0.080 0.185** 0.098 -0.217 -0.051***
(0.070) (0.058) (0.080) (0.063) (0.212) (0.016)
Oceania 0.142** 0.154** 0.138* -0.004 -0.445** -0.070***
(0.064) (0.069) (0.072) (0.055) (0.198) (0.016)
female -0.124*** 0.050*** -0.099*** -0.029** -0.017 0.020***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.042) (0.003)
loss -0.003
(0.002)
constant -0.191 0.081 5.093** -4.420** -11.931* -2.315***
(2.194) (1.949) (2.364) (2.050) (6.276) (0.443)
* (p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01)
We next look at legal origins (Porta et al., 2008). The regression is shown
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in table A.12. Once again, we conclude that our main variables remain highly
significant. Some of the legal origins dummies show significant results. However,
these results do not appear to be systematic in the sense of affecting several
parameters in a consistent fashion. Also, since there are very few countries in
each category, the variables risk picking up country fixed effects instead of actual
effects of legal origins.
Table A.12: Effects of income measures on risk preferences, legal origins
N=2939, LL = −216, 165 α+ β+ α− β− λ σ
GDP diff. from US -0.059*** -0.059*** -0.101*** 0.035*** 0.212*** 0.036***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.028) (0.002)
legor UK -0.004 -0.034 -0.118*** 0.017 0.316*** 0.012*
(0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.026) (0.081) (0.007)
legor French -0.031 -0.068** -0.066** -0.021 0.141** 0.019***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.030) (0.025) (0.069) (0.007)
legor Socialist 0.023 -0.011 -0.022 -0.012 -0.021 -0.035***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.024) (0.073) (0.007)
OPEC -0.264*** -0.162*** -0.206*** -0.079** 0.251* 0.054***
(0.035) (0.028) (0.036) (0.036) (0.149) (0.007)
private university 0.031 -0.052** -0.029 -0.039 0.030 -0.012**
(0.027) (0.022) (0.032) (0.025) (0.081) (0.005)
foreigner 0.023 0.000 -0.009 0.024 0.006 0.015**
(0.033) (0.030) (0.040) (0.029) (0.085) (0.007)
Gini difference 0.153* 0.143** 0.490*** 0.059 -0.397 -0.043**
(0.084) (0.072) (0.091) (0.077) (0.256) (0.021)
female -0.127*** 0.046*** -0.100*** -0.032** -0.025 0.020***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.042) (0.003)
loss -0.002
(0.002)
constant 0.791*** 1.048*** 0.959*** 0.920*** 1.458*** 0.149***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.023) (0.068) (0.007)
* (p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01)
Finally, we can take a look at institutional quality (Keefer and Knack, 1997).
The results are shown in table A.13. The institutional variable is the first prin-
cipal component of the five governance indicators used in the cited paper, voice
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and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory qual-
ity, and the rule of law. Once again, the effects found previously are largely
stable. The one and only exception to this rule is optimism for losses, which now
no longer shows a significant correlation with the GDP per capita measure. This
is likely due to the very high correlation between the GDP difference measure and
the institutional indicator (r = −0.890, p < 0.001). The institutional measure
itself mostly shows effects on the sensitivity parameters and loss aversion as well
as noise, with sensitivity decreasing and noise increasing for higher institutional
quality—holding GDP per capita constant.
Table A.13: Effects of income measures on risk preferences, institutions
N=2939, LL = −216, 980 α+ β+ α− β− λ σ
GDP diff. from US -0.091*** -0.056*** -0.120*** 0.010 0.157*** 0.045***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.054) (0.004)
institutional quality -0.020** 0.004 -0.015 -0.012 -0.022 0.007***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.029) (0.002)
OPEC -0.285*** -0.140*** -0.286*** -0.070* 0.402*** 0.072***
(0.033) (0.027) (0.033) (0.036) (0.152) (0.006)
private university 0.007 -0.063*** -0.052 -0.045* 0.085 0.002
(0.027) (0.022) (0.032) (0.025) (0.080) (0.005)
foreigner 0.026 0.000 -0.005 0.026 -0.001 0.018**
(0.034) (0.030) (0.040) (0.029) (0.081) (0.007)
Gini difference 0.053 0.109 0.357*** 0.044 -0.168 0.030
(0.090) (0.078) (0.097) (0.082) (0.253) (0.020)
female -0.122*** 0.046*** -0.098*** -0.029** -0.019 0.020***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.042) (0.003)
loss -0.003
(0.002)
constant 0.832*** 1.003*** 0.928*** 0.950*** 1.666*** 0.138***
(0.026) (0.024) (0.029) (0.024) (0.090) (0.008)
* (p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01)
Overall, the picture is thus quite clear. While some of the additional controls
explored here show some effects, they are generally of second order compared
to the ones shown by GDP per capita. The last remains strong and strongly
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significant throughout—a good indication that there ought indeed to be a direct
connection.
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G Correlation between pooled estimates and random
parameters
Figure A.6: Correlation between pooled estimates and random parameters: country dummies
78
H Full-lenght instructions (English)
Below we include the instructions in English, with amounts in Euros. Instructions




Thank you for participating in this experiment in decision making! You will obtained 4 Euros for 
having come to the experiment—those 4 Euros are yours to keep independently of the outcomes in 
the experiment. In addition, you will be compensated with whatever you earn during the experiment 
according to the procedures described in the instructions.
The instructions will be read to you in a short while. You may consult these instructions at any time 
during the experiment. In case you should have any questions or doubts, please raise your hand and 
an experimenter will come and assist you in private.
Please consider each decision carefully. Take a careful look at outcomes and the probabilities 
associated to them before taking a decision. Remember that your final payoffs from this experiment 
will depend on the decisions you make (and of course, on chance).
Please remain seated when you are finished with the tasks. This experiment consists of two parts. 
Once everybody has finished the tasks in part I, new instructions will be read to you for part II. At 
the very end of the experiment, you will be asked to fill out a questionnaire. The answer to the 
questionnaire as well as all your answers to the tasks will be private, and cannot be traced back to 
you personally. Once you are done filling in the questionnaire, an experimenter will call you up. 
Your payoff will then be determined in private, you will be given the money you won, after which 
you can leave.





In the present experiment, you will be asked to choose repeatedly between a fixed amount of money 
and a lottery. The lottery will always give you a chance to win one of two amounts of money. Figure 
1 shows a typical choice task. You are asked repeatedly to choose between playing the lottery and 
obtaining a sure amount of money. For each row, you are asked to indicate whether you would 
prefer to play the lottery or to obtain the sure amount of money by ticking the preferred option.
The urn indicated in the figure contains eight numbered balls. One ball will be extracted from the 
urn to determine your payoffs in case you should play the lottery. In the lottery displayed, if ball 1 , 
2 , 3, or 4 is extracted, you obtain €10; if ball 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 is extracted, you obtain nothing. Please 
pay close attention to the amounts to be won as well as the number of balls associated with each 
outcome, since they change across decisions.




O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
Win € 10 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
We are interested in the amount for which you will switch from preferring the lottery to preferring 
the sure amount. Most likely, you will begin by choosing the lottery for small sure amounts, and at a 
certain point switch to the sure amount as the latter increases. If you do not want the lottery at all, 
you can choose to get the sure amount in the first row and then continue with the sure amount for all 
choices (if you prefer €0.50 over the lottery you should also prefer €1.00 over the lottery, etc.). 
Where you will switch from the lottery to the sure amount depends entirely on your preferences—
there are no right or wrong answers. However, you should NOT switch back and forth several 
times between lottery and sure amount! You will be excluded from the experiment if you do so or 
if it is not possible to clearly recognize your preference (for example, if you have not ticked any box 














You will be asked to take 18 decisions, for each one of which you will need to decide between a 
lottery and a series of sure amounts as exemplified in figure 1 above. Please pay close attention to 
the amounts to be won as well as the number of balls associated with each outcome! Indeed, 
both the higher and lower amount, as well as the number of balls, change between decision 
problems. Since your final payoff depends on these decisions, it is crucial for you to pay close 
attention to these features.
There are two different types of lotteries involved. Figure 2 below shows the two different types 
of lotteries that you will encounter. Fig 2a shows the urn already familiar from figure 1 above. It 
contains exactly eight (8) balls, numbered from 1 to 8.
In Urn in Fig. 2b also contains exactly eight (8) balls. However, you cannot see what numbers the 
balls contained in the urn have. This means that you do not know the exact numbers that are 
present in that urn. All balls bear a number between 1 and 8 inclusive (have either 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 
6 , 7 , or 8 written on them), but it is possible that some numbers are absent from this urn while 
others occur repeatedly. Thus you do not know the exact composition of the urn.
Fig. 2a: transparent urn Fig. 2b: opaque urn
Payoff determination
After you have taken all the decisions, one of your decisions will be randomly drawn for real pay, 
i.e. the amounts indicated in the decision problem will be paid out for real. First, either part I or 
part II will be selected for real play by a coin flip. If part I is selected, then one of the 18 decision 
tasks is drawn at random, using a chance device with equal probability for each decision task to be 
extracted. For the extracted decision task, one of your decisions, corresponding to one row for 
which you had to indicate your preference between the sure amount and the lottery, will then be 
drawn at random with equal probability for each row. If for the row that is drawn you have 
indicated that you prefer the sure amount of money, you will simply be paid that amount.
In case you have chosen the lottery for the randomly determined row, then that lottery will be 
played according to the probabilities indicated. For the transparent urn, this will involve drawing a 
ball from an urn in which all numbers from 1 to 8 inclusive are present. If you should desire to do 
so, you can verify that there are indeed all balls from 1 to 8 in the urn. You will then be paid the 
outcome corresponding to the ball you drew. 
For the opaque urn, the procedure is exactly analogous, except that you will now draw a ball from a 
pre-composed urn, the exact composition of which you do not know. You will also be paid the 
outcome corresponding to the ball you drew. If you should desire to do so, after the draw you can 












O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
Win € 5 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 4.50 for sure
 














      Lottery Sure
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 10 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure














      Lottery Sure
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
O O € 12.00 for sure
O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure














      Lottery Sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
O O € 7.00 for sure
O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
Win € 30 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 12.00 for sure
 O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
O O € 19.50 for sure
O O € 20.00 for sure
O O € 20.50 for sure
O O € 21.00 for sure
O O € 21.50 for sure
O O € 22.00 for sure
O O € 22.50 for sure
O O € 23.00 for sure
O O € 23.50 for sure
O O € 24.00 for sure














      Lottery Sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
O O € 12.00 for sure
O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
Win € 30 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 17.00 for sure
 O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
Win € 10 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
O O € 19.50 for sure
O O € 20.00 for sure
O O € 20.50 for sure
O O € 21.00 for sure
O O € 21.50 for sure
O O € 22.00 for sure
O O € 22.50 for sure
O O € 23.00 for sure
O O € 23.50 for sure
O O € 24.00 for sure
O O € 24.50 for sure
O O € 25.00 for sure
O O € 25.50 for sure
O O € 26.00 for sure
O O € 26.50 for sure
O O € 27.00 for sure
O O € 27.50 for sure
O O € 28.00 for sure
O O € 28.50 for sure
O O € 29.00 for sure














      Lottery Sure
O O € 20.50 for sure
O O € 21.00 for sure
O O € 21.50 for sure
O O € 22.00 for sure
O O € 22.50 for sure
O O € 23.00 for sure
O O € 23.50 for sure
O O € 24.00 for sure
O O € 24.50 for sure
O O € 25.00 for sure
O O € 25.50 for sure
O O € 26.00 for sure
O O € 26.50 for sure
Win € 30 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 27.00 for sure
 O O € 27.50 for sure
O O € 28.00 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 28.50 for sure
O O € 29.00 for sure














      Lottery Sure
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
O O € 12.00 for sure
O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
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Decision 8
      Lottery Sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
O O € 7.00 for sure
O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 12.00 for sure
 O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
Win € 5 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
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Decision 9
      Lottery Sure
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
O O € 12.00 for sure
O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure














      Lottery Sure
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
O O € 12.00 for sure
O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure














      Lottery Sure
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
O O € 12.00 for sure
O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure














      Lottery Sure
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
O O € 12.00 for sure
O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure














      Lottery Sure
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
O O € 12.00 for sure
O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure














      Lottery Sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
O O € 7.00 for sure
O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 12.00 for sure
 O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
Win € 5 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure













      Lottery Sure
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
O O € 12.00 for sure
O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
O O € 19.50 for sure
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Decision 16
      Lottery Sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
O O € 7.00 for sure
O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 12.00 for sure
 O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
Win € 5 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
O O € 19.50 for sure
O O
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Decision 17
      Lottery Sure
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
O O € 12.00 for sure
O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
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Decision 18
      Lottery Sure
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
O O € 12.00 for sure
O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
O O € 19.50 for sure
1 3




      Lottery Sure
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
O O € 12.00 for sure
O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
O O € 19.50 for sure





      Lottery Sure
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
O O € 12.00 for sure
O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
O O € 19.50 for sure





      Lottery Sure
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
O O € 12.00 for sure
O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
O O € 19.50 for sure





      Lottery Sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
O O € 7.00 for sure
O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 12.00 for sure
 O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
Win € 5 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
O O € 19.50 for sure
O O





If part II should be chosen for real play, you are endowed with €20. These €20 are yours, but it is 
possible that you will lose part or all of the money in the experiment (but no more than that).
In part II you are again asked to repeatedly choose between the two types of lotteries you have 
already encountered in part I of the experiment and a series of sure amounts. However, the main 
difference now is that the amounts involved are negative instead of positive. Figure 4 shows an 
example of such a choice.
Fig. 4: example of a typical decision task from part II
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
Lose € 10 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
In the example displayed, you face the following lottery: if a ball with the number 1 , 2 , 3, or 4 is 
extracted, you lose €10. If a ball with the number 5 , 6 , 7 , or 8 is extracted, you lose nothing. 
Please choose again for each row whether you would rather give up (i.e., pay) the sure amount 
indicated to the right or play the lottery.
Notice that, most likely, you will now begin to the right by choosing to give up the sure amounts 
as long as this implies giving up small amounts, and then switch to the lottery at a certain point. If  
you do not want to give up sure amounts at all, then in the first row you can choose the lottery and 
then continue with the lottery for all choices (if you are not willing to pay €0.50 to avoid playing the 
lottery, then you should not be willing to pay €1.00 to avoid it). Once again, when exactly you 
switch from the sure loss to the lottery depends entirely on your preferences—there are no right or 
wrong answers. However, you should NOT switch back and forth several times between lottery 
and sure amount! You will be excluded from the experiment if you do so or if it is not possible to 
clearly recognize your preference (for example because you have not ticked any box for a given row 
or ticked both boxes for a row).
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negative and positive amounts are involved. Also, what changes is now not the sure amount to the 
right, which is always equal to zero, but rather the amount you can lose in the lottery. Figure 3 
shows an example of this kind of choice problem.
Fig. 3: decision task where lottery amount changes
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted:
 
If one of the following balls is extracted, then:
Lose € 20 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 19 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 18 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 17 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 16 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 15 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 14 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 13 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 12 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 11 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 10 O O € 0 for sure
What is required of you in this task is exactly the same as for the other tasks. For each row, you 
should choose whether you prefer the sure amount to the right (which is now always zero), or the 
lottery to the left. Pay attention however: what changes is now the amount that can be lost in the 
lottery. Most likely, you would thus start from the right and choose zero for high losses, and then 
switch to the left as the losses in the lottery get smaller. You can however also start with the lottery 
and continue with it if that is your preference (if you prefer a lottery in which you can win €20 or 
lose €20 to zero, then you should also prefer the lottery when you can lose only €19). When you 
switch from the zero sure amount to the lottery depends only on your preferences—there is no right 
or wrong answer. However, you should NOT switch back and forth several times between 
lottery and sure amount! You will be excluded from the experiment if you do so or if it is not 
possible to clearly recognize your preference (for example because you have not ticked any box for 
1 3 4










a given row or ticked both boxes for a row).
Payoff determination
In case part II should be chosen for real play, your payoff from part II will be determined in a way 
analogous to the payoff determination in the first part. First, one of the decision tasks will be chosen 
at random, and then one of the rows for which you had to indicate a choice. In each case, every 
choice task or row has an equal probability of being selected. According to your choice, you are 





O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
Lose € 5 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 4.50 for sure
 













      Lottery Sure
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 10 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure














      Lottery Sure
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
O O – € 12.00 for sure
O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure














      Lottery Sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
O O – € 7.00 for sure
O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 12.00 for sure
 O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
Lose € 5 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure














      Lottery Sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
O O – € 12.00 for sure
O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 17.00 for sure
 O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
Lose € 10 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure














      Lottery Sure
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
O O – € 12.00 for sure
O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure
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Decision II-7
      Lottery Sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
O O – € 7.00 for sure
O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 12.00 for sure
 O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
Lose € 5 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure
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Decision II-8
      Lottery Sure
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
O O – € 12.00 for sure
O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure














      Lottery Sure
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
O O – € 12.00 for sure
O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure














      Lottery Sure
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
O O – € 12.00 for sure
O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure














      Lottery Sure
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
O O – € 12.00 for sure
O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure














      Lottery Sure
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
O O – € 12.00 for sure
O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure














      Lottery Sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
O O – € 7.00 for sure
O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 12.00 for sure
 O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
Lose € 5 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure













      Lottery Sure
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
O O – € 12.00 for sure
O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure
O O – € 19.50 for sure
1
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Decision II-15
      Lottery Sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
O O – € 7.00 for sure
O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 12.00 for sure
 O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
Lose € 5 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure
O O – € 19.50 for sure
1
3 4 5 6 7 82
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Decision II-16
      Lottery Sure
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
O O – € 12.00 for sure
O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure
O O – € 19.50 for sure
1




      Lottery Sure
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
O O – € 12.00 for sure
O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure
O O – € 19.50 for sure
1 3




      Lottery Sure
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
O O – € 12.00 for sure
O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure
O O – € 19.50 for sure





      Lottery Sure
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
O O – € 12.00 for sure
O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure
O O – € 19.50 for sure





      Lottery Sure
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
O O – € 12.00 for sure
O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure
O O – € 19.50 for sure





      Lottery Sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
O O – € 7.00 for sure
O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 12.00 for sure
 O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
Lose € 5 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure
O O – € 19.50 for sure




Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted:
 
If one of the following balls is extracted, then:
Lottery Sure
Lose € 20 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 19 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 18 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 17 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 16 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 15 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 14 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 13 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 12 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 11 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 10 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 9 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 8 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 7 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 6 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 5 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 4 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 3 O O € 0 for sure
1 3 4











Please answer the following questions about yourself. All answers are confidential and cannot be traced back to you  
personally.
Age: ___________            Study semester:____________
 O  female                O male 
What is your studies major?
O economics or business







Please indicate your grade point average: __________
Are you originally from $$name of country where exp. is to take place$$?          O yes        O no
If not, which country are you from originally? __________________
Are both your parents from $$name of country where exp. is to take place$$?     O yes        O no
Have you ever lived abroad for a significant period of time?
O never
O less than six months
O between six months and a year
O between one and two years
O between two and five years
O longer than five years
Could you give a rough indication of your monthly living expenses? _________
Could you give a rough indication of your monthly stipend?     ___________
Please indicate how many older siblings you have:_____________
Please indicate how many younger siblings you have:______________
Are you married?       O yes        O no
How tall are you? ___________cm
Please consider the following statement: “Man-induced climate change is a serious danger that could threaten our way 
of life”. Please indicate on the scale below the extent to which you agree with this statement, with 1 indicating “I don't  
agree at all” and 7 indicating “I fully agree”:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
O O O O O O O
Please consider the following statement: “It is imperative to take immediate action to limit potential catastrophic 
consequences from changes in global climate, even if such action may be costly”. Please indicate on the scale below the  
extent to which you agree with this statement, with 1 indicating “I don't agree at all” and 7 indicating “I fully agree”:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
O O O O O O O
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1. Individuals should sacrifice self-interest for the group that they belong to O O O O O
2. Individuals should stick with the group even through difficulties O O O O O
3. Group welfare is more important than individual rewards O O O O O
4. Group success is more important than individual success O O O O O
5. Individuals should pursue their goals after considering the welfare of the group O O O O O
6. Group loyalty should be encouraged even if individual goals suffer O O O O O
7. People in higher positions should make most decisions without consulting people 
in lower positions
O O O O O
8. People in higher positions should not delegate important tasks to people in lower 
positions
O O O O O
9. People in higher positions should not ask the opinions of people in lower 
positions too frequently
O O O O O
10. People ion higher positions should avoid social interaction with people in lower 
positions
O O O O O
11. People in lower positions should not disagree with decisions made by people in 
higher positions
O O O O O
12. It is important to have instructions spelled out in detail so that I always know 
what I am expected to do
O O O O O
13. It is important to closely follow instructions and procedures O O O O O
14. Rules/regulations are important because they inform me of what is expected of 
me
O O O O O
15. Standardized work procedures are helpful O O O O O
16. Instructions for operations are important O O O O O
17. It is more important for men to have a professional career than it is for women O O O O O
18. Men usually solve problems with logical analysis; women usually solve 
problems with intuition
O O O O O
19. Solving difficult problems usually requires an active forcible approach, which is 
typical for men
O O O O O
20. There are some jobs that a man can always do better than a woman O O O O O
21. Even though certain food products are available in a number of different flavors, 
I tend to buy the same flavor
O O O O O
22. I would rather stick with a brand I usually buy than try something I am not very 
sure of
O O O O O
23. I think of myself as a brand-loyal consumer O O O O O
24. When I go to a restaurant, I feel it is safer to order dishes I am familiar with O O O O O
25. If I like a brand, I rarely switch from it just to try something different O O O O O
26. I am very cautious in trying new or different products O O O O O
27. I rarely buy brands about which I am uncertain how they will perform O O O O O
28. I usually eat the same kinds of foods on a regular basis O O O O O
How do you see yourself? Are you generally a person who is fully willing to take risks or do you try to avoid taking 





0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
O O O O O O O O O O O
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People can behave differently in different situations.
How would you rate your willingness to take risks in the following areas?
How is it …   fully prepared
                                     risk averse                  to take risks
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
– while driving? O O O O O O O O O O O
– in financial matters? O O O O O O O O O O O
– during leisure and sport? O O O O O O O O O O O
– in your occupation? O O O O O O O O O O O
– with your health? O O O O O O O O O O O
– your faith in other people? O O O O O O O O O O O
Please consider what you would do in the following situation:
Imagine that you had won 100,000 Euros in the lottery. Almost immediately after you collect the winnings, you receive 
the following financial offer from a reputable bank, the conditions of which are as follows:
There is the chance to double the money within two years. It is equally possible that you could lose half of the amount 
invested. You have the opportunity to invest the full amount, part of the amount or reject the offer. What share of your 
lottery winnings would you be prepared to invest in this financially risky, yet lucrative investment?
O   100.000 Euros
O    80.000 Euros
O  60.000 Euros
O  40.000 Euros
O  20.000 Euros
O  Nothing, I would decline the offer
How many inhabitants has the town where you lived at the age of 16?
____________________inhabitants








O other:  ________________
Thank you for taking part in this experiment! Please remain seated until an experimenter 
calls you up.
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Figure A.7: Correlation between pooled estimates and random parameters: macro indicators
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